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NEPAL'S MAOISTS: THEIR AIMS, STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In less than ten years, the Maoist insurgency has 
transformed Nepal. The Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) has spread armed conflict across the country 
and reshaped its political environment irrevocably. But 
their political aims are still questioned, and not enough 
is known about their structure and strategy. This 
background report seeks to fill in many of the gaps, based 
on close study of their writings and actions and a wide 
range of interviews, in order to provide policymakers in 
Nepal and the international community with information 
and insights needed to approach a peace process 
realistically.  
The Maoists are at heart a political party. They have 
developed military capacity but it is subordinated to 
political control. They use terror tactics and coercion but 
they are not simply terrorists. They maintain links to other 
communist revolutionary groups on the subcontinent but 
they are neither Khmer Rouge clones nor is their campaign 
part of any global terrorism.  
Maoist strategy is of a protracted people's war, both 
political and military -- the two cannot be separated. They 
have a long-term vision, and they have patience. They can 
be extremely astute politically (their September 2005 
unilateral ceasefire announcement) but can also make 
grave miscalculations in terms of their own long-term 
objectives (their mishandling of leadership differences in 
early 2005). 
The Maoists are not likely to collapse because of internal 
disputes. There are undoubtedly tensions within the top 
leadership and challenges of command and control but 
these do not add up to fatal weaknesses. The state's 
security-driven agenda under a succession of governments 
lacking legitimacy has only further strengthened their 
position. 
The insurgents are pragmatic and tactically flexible. 
They are aware they will not win an outright military 
victory and have realised that an instant transition to 
socialism is impossible. They are willing to compromise 
to some degree and are keen to engage with domestic 
and international political forces. 
The Maoists have employed force for political ends since 
the start of their armed campaign in 1996. They have used 
torture, execution and other forms of violence including 
terror and extortion. But they have also been more 
restrained than many insurgent groups: they have limited 
civilian casualties and generally avoided indiscriminate 
attacks. They have left the economy functional, if 
weakened, and have never targeted foreign nationals. 
The Maoists are sensitive to domestic and international 
opinion. However, despite their philosophy of people's 
war they are not dependent on popular support. The 
seriousness of their engagement in any peace process will 
depend on their perceptions of risks and opportunities. 
The international community may play an important role 
in shaping these. 
Senior Maoist leaders may well be motivated by a genuine 
desire for social and economic transformation. Their 
pursuit of domestic transformation takes precedence over 
their professed commitment to global revolution. They are 
more interested in controlling development efforts across 
Nepal and consolidating their grip on local populations' 
daily lives. 
That the Maoists must be dealt with realistically is 
something Nepal's mainstream politicians have long 
understood. Having been on the receiving end of many of 
the rebels' most brutal assaults, they harbour no illusions 
about Maoist respect for political dissent. But at the same 
time they see the possibility of using both carrot and stick 
to persuade the Maoists to engage with them politically 
with the aim of getting agreement on a common program 
that would address certain of their demands that have won 
widespread support. 
The Maoists themselves have acted pragmatically 
throughout much of the conflict. They have always 
kept in mind the need to hold the door open for future 
rehabilitation and reconciliation and have maintained 
a dialogue with mainstream forces partly to this end. 
They have also adopted a moderate policy towards 
international development efforts and have long called 
for international facilitation of a peace process. 
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Behaviour towards the newly established United Nations 
human rights mission will be a crucial test of Maoist 
attitudes and capacities. If they can prove that they are 
ready for peace and capable of implementing a negotiated 
settlement, the political mainstream will be ready to deal 
with them. Judging by widespread popular relief following 
their September 2005 declaration of a unilateral three-
month ceasefire, Nepal's people would back a reasonable 
compromise that delivers peace. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 27 October 2005 
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NEPAL'S MAOISTS: THEIR AIMS, STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY 
I. BACKGROUND: MAOISM AND 
NEPAL 
When Nepal's Maoists -- the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist), the CPN(M) -- launched their "people's war" in 
February 1996, they were easily dismissed as a small 
communist splinter group that could do no more than stir 
up trouble in a handful of remote regions. They had almost 
no weapons, a tiny organisational base and a strategy that 
seemed outdated and unrealistic. But their movement has 
grown to the point where the state has relinquished control 
over most of Nepal's territory.1 They have proved capable 
of outmanoeuvring mainstream parties politically and, 
when conditions are in their favour, of successfully 
attacking the well-armed Royal Nepalese Army (RNA). 
In the face of concerted efforts to defeat them, their 
insurgency has proved resilient. 
Despite the Maoists' rise to prominence and the growing 
international concern at their threat to Nepal's established 
polity, surprisingly little is known about them. This is partly 
because of their own secretiveness: as an underground 
movement the Maoists are cautious about their security and 
keen to control their public image by restricting negative 
news. But it is also because most observers have been 
reluctant to grapple with the politics of the movement.2 
 
 
1 The Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) denies that control has been 
relinquished over most of Nepal's territory. It states: "…since 1 
February to date…we truly believe that we have been able to 
contain terror activities of the Maoist on innocent citizens in the 
capital. With regards to the security situation in the country side, 
it is true that we have not been able to have a security presence 
in all the villages in the country. This is largely because of the 
lack of manpower, but it is not true that little has changed in the 
security situation in the country side. As the RNA's force is 
strengthened due to the prevailing needs of the country, we will 
continue to provide more security units in as many rural areas as 
we can to defensively deploy the army to provide security to the 
people….The Maoists do not control any areas nor do they have 
any liberated areas". Letter from Brigadier Dipak K. Gurung, 
director, Directorate of Public Relations, Royal Nepalese Army 
Headquarters, to Gareth Evans, Crisis Group President, 20 
October 2005. Brigadier Gurung was writing in response to 
Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°41, Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule, 
15 September 2005.  
2 Crisis Group reporting on the Nepal conflict since April 2003 
is available at www.crisisgroup.org. There is also a growing 
 
Like most communists, Nepal's Maoists are prolific 
writers and theorists and have produced a large body of 
work which sheds light on their goals and strategy. They 
have also been skilled propagandists, producing their own 
publications, running FM radio stations and using the 
domestic and international media to promote their point 
of view. In many key respects, the Maoists have done 
what they said they would do. Understanding their plans 
is not only crucial to tackling the insurgency militarily -- a 
task which has proved beyond the state so far -- but also 
to dealing with it pragmatically and plotting possible 
routes to a negotiated settlement. 
This background report draws on many of the Maoists' 
own writings and statements, as well as much other 
material, to examine three basic questions: 
 Who are Nepal's Maoists and what do they want to 
achieve? Are they really Maoist at all? Politics lie 
at the heart of the insurgency and understanding 
Maoist goals and political culture is essential to 
understanding the rationale for their armed struggle. 
It can also help efforts to bring them into the 
framework of parliamentary politics by addressing 
reasonable elements of their program. 
 How is the movement organised and led? On 
paper, the structure is simple: party, army and 
united front. But the differences between theory 
 
 
body of literature on the Maoist movement. Significant works 
published before February 2004 are detailed in Ramesh Parajuli, 
Maoist Movement of Nepal: A Selected Bibliography 
(Kathmandu: Martin Chautari, 2004). Background reading 
on the insurgency in English includes Deepak Thapa (ed.), 
Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal (Kathmandu: 
Martin Chautari, 2003; Karki and Seddon (eds.), The People's 
War in Nepal: Left Perspective, (Delhi: Adroit, 2003); Deepak 
Thapa with Bandita Sijapati, A Kingdom under Siege: Nepal's 
Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003 (Kathmandu: The Printhouse, 
2003); Michael Hutt (ed.), Himalayan 'People's War' (London: 
Hurst and Company, 2004). A large number of Maoist 
documents, including articles, policy papers, press statements 
and interviews, are available on the internet, especially at 
www.cpnm.org. The Maoists have also published two useful 
collections in book format: Some Important Documents of 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (Janadisha Publications, 
2004) and Problems and Prospects of Revolution in Nepal 
(Janadisha Publications, 2004). 
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and practice are revealing, as are the ways in 
which the Maoists have departed from historical 
precedents. Questions of resources, support base 
and command and control also give clues to Maoist 
strengths and weaknesses. 
 What are the Maoists' strategy and tactics? Are there 
signs that they will settle for a negotiated peace? 
The overall strategy of protracted people's war is 
well known in name but needs to be understood in 
context. The Maoists' public announcement that 
they have entered the final stage of strategic 
offensive implies confidence of a military victory. 
But in fact, there are more signs that the Maoists' 
internal politics are putting the party in a good 
position to compromise. 
The Maoists themselves have fed the confusion over their 
true aims with a plethora of seemingly contradictory 
statements. Still proud to lay claim to the legacy of China's 
turbulent Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, they have also 
repeatedly insisted that they do not have a totalitarian 
vision for a future state. Calls for the rapid establishment 
of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" have been supplanted 
by emphasis on the need first to complete Nepal's 
"bourgeois democratic revolution" and establish a true 
multiparty democracy.3 
The Maoists have also welcomed the establishment of a 
United Nations human rights monitoring mission and 
vowed to abide by international humanitarian law.4 Which 
of the many faces presented to the outside world is the 
true one? What does the speed with which the Maoists 
have often shifted positions say about their ultimate 
intentions? There are no definitive answers to these 
questions. Indeed, as the ongoing debates within the 
CPN(M) indicate, it may well be that the Maoists 
themselves have yet to settle on final answers. But this 
report attempts to lay out the evidence on which at least a 
better informed estimate of Maoist intentions and capacity 
can be made. 
The scope of this report is limited. It is analytical rather 
than judgmental, drawing on dozens of published and 
private sources, including Crisis Group interviews that 
allow the Maoists to explain what they stand for in their 
own words.5 In doing this it seeks not to endorse any 
position but rather to test assertions against available 
evidence, though these sources in many instances are 
inevitably inadequate and self-interested. 
 
 
3 Prachanda, press statement, 10 May 2005. 
4 Prachanda, press statement, 13 April 2005. 
5 Maoist terms such as "people's war", "people's governments", 
"People's Liberation Army", etc. are generally used without 
quotation marks. This is primarily for ease of reading and, of 
course, does not imply endorsement. 
Nevertheless, published Maoist writings, if read carefully, 
do tend to provide a reasonable guide to the movement's 
political culture and strategic aims, though statements on 
topics such as military clashes and political achievements 
tend to be designed as propaganda and must be approached 
with some scepticism. The Maoists are understandably 
keen to portray themselves in a good light and are, 
therefore, hardly forthcoming about indiscipline within 
their ranks or violations of international law. Maoist 
strategy has been fairly consistent since the early 1990s 
but since they adapt tactics to changing circumstances, 
observers are often confused. This report concentrates on 
providing a background guide to underlying politics 
and structural factors as a basis for more detailed reporting 
on specific issues in future. 
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II. MAOIST POLITICS 
A. POLITICAL PROGRAM 
1. New democracy 
The basic aim of the CPN(M) armed struggle is to capture 
state power and establish "new people's democracy" (naulo 
janbad).6 The concept of "new democracy" is inherited 
from the thoughts of Mao Zedong, which in turn built 
on the views of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin. The "new 
democratic revolution" marks the transition from the 
classical Marxist stages of bourgeois hegemony ("old 
democracy") to proletarian hegemony ("new democracy").7 
For a society in which even the bourgeois democratic 
revolution has not reached completion, however -- such 
as China in the 1930s or Nepal in the current Maoist 
analysis -- the new democratic revolution can telescope 
the stages of bourgeois and proletarian hegemony. 
Combined with the Leninist theory of "continuous 
revolution", this forms the basis of the Nepali Maoists' 
vision of their struggle: 
This plan would be based on the aim of completing 
the new democratic revolution after the destruction 
of feudalism and imperialism, then immediately 
moving towards socialism, and, by way of cultural 
revolutions based on the theory of continuous 
revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
marching to communism -- the golden future of the 
whole humanity.8 
 
 
6 This report follows Martin Hoftun, William Raeper and John 
Whelpton, People, Politics and Ideology (Kathmandu, 1999), 
pp. 200, 238 in translating janbad as "people's democracy". This 
brings out the Nepali language's clear distinction between janbad 
and prajatantra, both of which could be simply rendered in 
English as "democracy" but which carry very different 
connotations. To complicate the picture further, mainstream 
politicians increasingly prefer the term loktantra to prajatantra: 
praja ("offspring" or "subject") has paternalistic connotations 
while lok simply means "people" and carries less pejorative 
overtones. 
7 A succinct but authoritative explanation of Mao's concept of 
new democracy can be found in Stuart Schram, The Thought of 
Mao Tse-tung (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 76-79. Mao's own seminal 
essay on the topic is "On the New Democracy", 1940, reproduced 
in Jacobs and Baerwald (eds.), Chinese Communism: Selected 
Documents (New York, 1963), pp. 66-77. 
8 "Theoretical Premises for the Historic Initiation of the 
People's War", in Some Important Documents of Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist) (Janadisha Publications, 2004). 
Excerpts from the document "Plan for the Historic Initiation of 
the People's War", adopted by the Central Committee of the 
Party in September 1995. 
When the Maoists launched the people's war, they used 
their appeal to citizens to declare their resolve "to initiate 
the process of forcibly smashing this reactionary state and 
establishing a New Democratic state", in accordance with 
"the almighty ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to 
free humanity forever from the yoke of class exploitation".9 
The question of what kind of "dictatorship" would be 
required to oversee this process has been answered in 
different ways, with the traditional Marxist "dictatorship 
of the proletariat" generally being supplanted by the Maoist 
concept of a mixed-class "people's democratic dictatorship": 
"The fundamental character of New Democratic or 
People's Democratic republican state shall be the people's 
democratic dictatorship with the participation of all the 
progressive classes including the national bourgeoisie and 
oppressed nations/nationalities based on worker-peasant 
alliance under the leadership of the proletariat".10 
The concept of naulo janbad is far from exclusive to the 
Maoists. At the start of the 1990s almost all of Nepal's 
communist factions shared this goal. Most of them believed 
that multiparty democracy could be one of the stages in 
reaching this goal: "The disagreement was over how to 
travel along the road and on how pluralist the political 
institutions of naulo janbad would be".11 While the 
moderate Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-
Leninist), the UML, opted for bahudaliya janbad 
(multiparty people's democracy), the Maoists hardened 
their opposition to the multiparty system that Nepal was 
moving towards.12 Interviewed in September 1990, 
Baburam Bhattarai, who became the chief Maoist 
ideologue, explained the reasons for his criticism of 
parliamentary democracy and plans for a reformed system: 
In a parliamentary democracy you don't redistribute 
the property, you just advocate free competition. 
Free competition among unequals is naturally in 
favour of the more powerful ones. When we 
perform this new democratic revolution, we will 
 
 
9 "Appeal of the C.P.N. (Maoist) to the People: March Along 
the Path of People's War to Smash the Reactionary State and 
Establish a New Democratic State!", in ibid. This is a translation 
of the leaflet distributed across Nepal by the CPN(M) at the start 
of the insurgency in February 1996. 
10 Common Minimum Policy and Program of the United 
Revolutionary People's Council, Nepal, Article 1. 
11 Martin Hoftun et al., op. cit., p. 238. 
12 The "people's movement", led by a coalition of previously 
underground political parties, brought an end to three decades 
of absolute monarchical rule. King Birendra capitulated to 
demonstrators' demands for an end to the Panchayat system in 
April 1990, and a new multiparty constitution was 
promulgated in November 1990. For details, see Crisis Group 
Asia Report N°99, Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The 
Constitutional Issues, 15 June 2005. 
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immediately redistribute property. We will 
confiscate all landed property and redistribute the 
wealth among the poor. The political institutions 
may be the same. We believe in political freedom. 
We will have elections, but the elections so far have 
been dominated by money.13 
Maoist thinking has veered between more radical and 
moderate versions of this basic line.14 But they have been 
flexible in their approach, eschewing hardline demands if 
the circumstances require. For example, in the second 
peace talks with the government in 2003, they were willing 
to compromise on fundamental economic policy measures, 
such as accommodating foreign capital, which they have 
otherwise characterised as imperialist and "comprador".15  
The Maoists believe nationalism provides an emotional 
rallying point for violent struggle: "The Nepalese people 
are very conscious and sensitive about the question of 
nationalism, and…they feel proud to lay down their lives 
while fighting rather than submit to the pressures of the 
foreigners".16 Nepal's Maoists have also drawn heavily on 
caste and ethnic grievances to mobilise popular support. 
They have likewise selected targets for political activism 
-- such as high private school fees -- designed to win 
middle class support. Their relative openness to foreign-
aided development projects and ambivalence on key 
economic questions also points to a more pragmatic 
approach. 
2. Immediate demands 
Just before the launch of their people's war, the Maoists 
had submitted a 40-point demand to then Prime Minister 
Sher Bahadur Deuba. The headline points were related 
directly to nationalism.17 Four were targeted specifically 
 
 
13 Martin Hoftun et al., op. cit., p. 239. 
14 The "hard" and "soft" lines on pluralist political institutions, 
and their significance in the search for peace, are discussed 
below. 
15 Comprador, as used in Mao's analysis and, following from 
it, Nepali Maoist texts, refers to subservient domestic 
intermediaries or partners of foreign capital and governments 
who are instrumental in the subordination of the national 
economy to imperialism and foreign capital. 
16 "Strategy and Tactics of Armed Struggle in Nepal", 
document adopted by the third plenum of the CPN (Maoist), 
March 1995. Much of this sentiment is directed toward 
resentment of the role India has often played in Nepal.  
17 For a breakdown of the 40 demands in nationalist, political, 
economic and social categories, see Harka Gurung, Ananda 
Aditya, Surendra K.C., Chuda Bahadur Shrestha and Sudheer 
Sharma, An Overview of Recent Armed Conflict in Nepal 
(Kathmandu, 2001), p. 97. The Maoists' own categories were: 
"Demands related to nationalism", "Demands related to the public 
 
at India, demanding the removal of "unequal stipulations 
and agreements" in the 1950 Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship (although not cancellation of the treaty 
itself);18 nullification of the 1996 Mahakali Treaty on 
water resources;19 control of the Nepal-India border and 
banning of Indian-registered cars from driving in the 
country; and lastly, a moralistic demand to stop the 
"cultural pollution of imperialists and expansionists", 
which primarily meant that "import and distribution of 
vulgar Hindi films, video cassettes and magazines should 
be stopped". 
None of these demands can be described as particularly 
Maoist: many of them have been raised repeatedly across 
the political spectrum. Other nationalistic demands were 
primarily economic: that foreign (British and Indian) 
recruitment of Gurkha troops should cease and "decent 
jobs" be arranged for recruits; that foreign technicians 
should not be given preference over Nepalis; that the 
"monopoly of foreign capital" should be stopped; that 
customs duties should provide "sufficient income…for 
the country's economic development"; and that "bribing 
by imperialists and expansionists in the name of NGOs 
and INGOs should be stopped". 
The primary Maoist demands have remained largely 
consistent since the earlier rounds of failed negotiation: a 
roundtable conference, interim government and elections 
to a constituent assembly. Since the royal coup of February 
2005, however, their willingness to include the king in 
talks has decreased, and they have pushed the mainstream 
parties to accept the idea of a rapid transition to an interim 
government (in which they would hope to play a major 
role). They have already won considerable mainstream 
support for the concept of a constituent assembly, although 
their model has not been elaborated, and there are many 
potential pitfalls.20 
3. Attitudes towards the monarchy 
One of the Maoists' ultimate goals is a republic. However, 
the initial 40 points they demanded did not tackle this 
question head on but rather called for a new constitution 
"drafted by the people's elected representatives" and for the 
army, police and administration to be "under the people's 
control". The only direct statement on the monarchy was 
that "all the special rights and privileges of the King and 
 
 
and its well-being" and "Demands related to the people's living" 
For the text of the 40 demands, see Appendix F. 
18 The treaty is available at http://www.nepaldemocracy.org/ 
documents/treaties_agreements/indo-nepal_treaty_peace.htm. 
19 The treaty is available at http://www.nepaldemocracy.org/ 
documents/treaties_agreements/indo-nepal_treaty_mahakali.htm. 
20 See Crisis Group Report, Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal, 
op. cit. 
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his family should be ended". The CPN (Unity Centre), the 
immediate predecessor to the CPN(M), had opposed the 
"the monarchical parliamentary multi-party system" and 
viewed the real aim of the 1990 people's movement as 
having been "to end the monarchical system".21 After two 
years of armed insurgency, the CPN(M) reiterated that "the 
analysis of the reactionaries that the king and monarchy 
are deep-rooted in the Nepalese society is not true.…It 
was only after the emergence of the centralised feudal 
state in a certain stage of development of class division 
that attempts had been made to unnaturally impose the 
king and monarchism through the practices of the system 
of reward-and-punishment and divine theory".22 
Nevertheless, when it came to negotiations in 2003, the 
Maoists said they supported a freely elected constituent 
assembly and would, therefore, not impose their policy by 
force: "Different political forces can go to the people with 
their own views on monarchy and other progressive issues, 
and the final verdict of the people would be acceptable to 
everybody concerned".23 During peace talks in both 2001 
and 2003, the Maoists signalled that they would likely 
accept a continuing role for the monarchy if it were purely 
ceremonial. The royal coup of February 2005 and the 
growing rift between the palace and the mainstream parties 
have led to a hardening of rhetoric.24 But the emergence 
of strong republican sentiment in student politics and 
within parts of the Congress and UML leadership has 
helped the Maoists pursue their preferred tactics. 
While the CPN(M) wants a republic, it realises that it 
will be much more effective to encourage the pursuit of 
this demand by mainstream politicians than to push it 
unilaterally.25 Party chairman and overall leader Prachanda 
 
 
21 Political Line of CPN (Unity Centre). 
22 "Experiences of the People's War and Some Important 
Questions" in Some Important Documents Of Communist Party 
Of Nepal (Maoist), op. cit. (Extract from the resolution adopted 
at the Fourth Expanded Meeting of the Central Committee of 
the Party, in August 1998.) 
23 An Executive Summary of the Proposal Put Forward by 
CPN (Maoist) for the Negotiations. See Appendix G. 
24 "Raja ra dal: bhet nahune batotira", Himal Khabarpatrika, 
30 May 2005. 
25 "The democratic movement of the Nepalese people against 
absolute monarchy, going on for more than half a century, is 
now heading towards a climax. Whereas the eight-year-long 
People's War (PW) led by the CPN (Maoist) for a people's 
republic has virtually wiped out the feudal socio-economic and 
cultural roots of the monarchy from the vast rural areas, the 
students affiliated to the major parliamentary parties, so far 
committed to the constitutional monarchy, have now switched 
over to the slogan of a republic and are spearheading the 
movement in the urban areas. This historical confluence of the 
two currents of the democratic movement, i.e. revolutionary 
and parliamentary, for the abolition of the monarchy and 
institutionalisation of the republic has opened an excellent 
 
claims to be confident: "The Party wants to institutionalise 
a republican form of state through the Constituent 
Assembly and believes that in a free and fair election 
the mandate of the Nepalese people would be in favour 
of a republic".26 At the same time, senior mainstream 
politicians still believe the Maoists might accept a 
ceremonial monarchy, with no powers, especially over 
the military.27 
B. ECONOMIC PROGRAM 
For the Maoists, changes in Nepal's political institutions 
are only the means to a much more far-reaching 
transformation of its social and economic structure. The 
concentration on headline demands such as republicanism 
and a new constitution has often distracted attention from 
their economic and social goals, many of which have 
been elaborated in some detail. Maoist attitudes on these 
illustrate the nature of their movement and hint at their 
likely program if they were ever to gain power. 
Their economic plans offer a hybrid model incorporating 
capitalist elements on a strongly nationalist frame. This 
reflects the post-colonial "mixed economy" applied in 
countries such as India, Sri Lanka and Egypt rather than a 
Stalinist command economy. The basic idea is that the 
"commanding heights" of the economy should be controlled 
by the state, while the rest is left to private capital. 
Plans for social and cultural reform, not least the ambitious 
goal of eliminating caste, ethnic, gender and regional 
disparities and discrimination, are both a central plank 
of Maoist policy and a major selling point to many 
marginalised communities. The Maoists have tried to put 
some policies into practice in areas under their control and 
have brought about limited change. But the questions of 
how genuinely they believe in their stated policy and how 
closely they would insist on it if they gained any share of 
national power remain unanswered.28 
The starting point for Maoist analysis is their conviction 
that Nepal is "semi-feudal", "semi-colonial", and at the 
 
 
prospect for consummation of the anti-monarchy democratic 
movement in the country". "Relevance of Monarchy in Nepal", 
Approach Paper presented by the Nepalese People's Right 
Protection Committee, India, New Delhi, 12 February 2004, 
available at http://cpnm.org/new/English/articles_news/relevance 
_monarch.htm. 
26 Prachanda, "A Brief Introduction to the Policies of the 
C.P.N. (Maoist)", The Worker, No. 9, February 2004. 
27 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, July and August 2005. 
28 Maoist policy on ethnic autonomy and local government 
will be the subject of detailed future Crisis Group reporting. 
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mercy of imperialism and Indian expansionism.29 Its 
people suffer economic exploitation and discrimination 
on many grounds. For Baburam Bhattarai, the people's 
war is a means to solve the economic problems of 
underdevelopment induced by imperialism, semi-
feudalism and international capitalism.30 In this 
view, Nepal lost its economic self-sufficiency and 
independence with British colonial dominance of South 
Asia. Trade imbalances with post-independence India, 
Indian investors' control of much of the economy and 
exploitation of its resources, along with ready access to 
cheap Nepali labour, have exacerbated this loss of 
economic autonomy. 
The Maoists claim that Nepal's dependence on agriculture 
is primarily due to the distorting effects of the Indian 
economy and trade. On top of this, Nepal's "semi-feudal" 
society has contributed to stunted economic development 
and extreme regional imbalances. Nepali capitalism is 
based on import-dependent merchant capital concentrated 
in the hands of a few magnates, usury-driven finance 
capital and aid-financed bureaucratic capital. This has 
retarded the development of production-oriented national 
capital: "Thus, to develop national industrial capital by 
destroying the [foreign-origin] and bureaucratic capital 
and to pave the path of self-reliant development by 
breaking away…[from] dependency, a revolutionary 
transformation of society and the process of People's War 
have become inevitable".31  
In this sense, the people's war is not only a political 
but also an economic program. Bhattarai proposes the 
following broad prescriptive measures for economic 
development policy: 
 changing production relations: confiscating land 
from the feudals and capital from the comprador-32 
bureaucratic classes; 
 mixed ownership: land to be owned individually by 
peasants; major industries and financial companies 
to be state-owned, with joint-ventures between state 
and productive private capital; small and medium 
businesses and trade to be owned by private 
individuals; 
 a protected and regulated economy: to ensure 
independent and self-reliant development; 
 
 
29 This analysis is repeated consistently in Maoist policy 
documents such as the Political Line of CPN (Unity Centre) and 
shapes the URPC program. 
30 Baburam Bhattarai, Politico-Economic Rationale of the 
People's War in Nepal (Kathmandu, 1998), available at 
http://insof.org/collected/bb_pe-rational.htm. 
31 Ibid. 
32 See fn. 15 above. 
 planned development: not a Soviet-style command 
economy but "a genuine mass-oriented and efficient 
economy functioning under a centralised leadership 
and guidance and decentralised initiative and 
management, which to a large extent was practiced 
in China during Mao's time"; and 
 balanced development: economic and geographic 
balance between country and town, hill and plains, 
agriculture and industry, etc., but with industry as 
the leading sector and agriculture the foundation, 
the overall aim being "the urbanisation of the 
countryside and not the ruralisation of the cities". 
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III. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Nepal's Maoists have attempted to emulate the classic 
Chinese communist structure of "three magic weapons": 
party, army and united front. The policy of the immediate 
predecessor to the CPN(M), the CPN (Unity Centre), 
explicitly endorsed the threefold revolutionary organisation. 
Significantly, it made clear that the united front would get 
only subsidiary attention, while the major effort went into 
the party and the army. This early indication of priorities 
may go some way towards explaining the shape the Maoist 
movement has subsequently taken: 
For the success of the New Democratic revolution, 
it is a must, as taught by Comrade Mao, to develop 
the three instruments of "revolutionary Communist 
Party, revolutionary United Front and People's 
Army". It is evident that in such a revolution 
the role of the Communist Party and the people's 
war would be primary and that of the mass and 
class organisations and the people's movement 
be secondary. It is of primary importance to move 
ahead with a concrete program for the development 
of these instruments.33 
The Maoists do not publicise their command structure, 
and they protect the identities of many people in 
leadership positions. The means by which they maintain 
a system of command and control is kept deliberately 
obscure, and most of their leaders remain underground. 
But they have definitely followed the Chinese threefold 
system, within which they have generally emphasised 
the development of the party over the army and both of 
these over the united front. 
The party has overall responsibility for all activities related 
to the "people's war" and for the development of policy. 
The army (PLA), which is under the full control of the 
party, is responsible for both offensive operations against 
the "enemy side" and defensive arrangements. Prachanda 
retains the top positions in both organisations, as chairman 
of the party and supreme commander of the PLA. The 
central body of the "united front" is the United People's 
Revolutionary Council Nepal, which the Maoists have 
fashioned partly as a revolutionary tool and partly as a 
central people's government in waiting. 
 
 
33 "Political Line of CPN (Unity Centre)" in Some Important 
Documents, op. cit. This is an extract from the Political Report 
adopted by the Unity Convention of the then CPN (Unity 
Centre) in December 1991. The Party's name was changed to 
CPN (Maoist) after the Third Expanded Meeting of the Central 
Committee in February 1995. 
A. THE PARTY 
The CPN(M) is in many respects similar to mainstream 
political parties within Nepal and beyond. Its organisation 
follows communist principles but the resulting model 
is not dissimilar to that of the Nepali Congress or other 
moderate groups. Overall control of the party and military 
remains firmly with the "party headquarters", which in 
practice means Prachanda. He has the authority to take all 
immediate decisions, though these can subsequently be 
discussed by party committees which have the power to 
endorse, revise or -- occasionally -- reject them. 
Political leadership. The organisational hierarchy under 
the chairman consists respectively of the standing 
committee, politburo, central committee, divisional 
commands, regional bureaus, sub-regional bureaus, district, 
area and cell committees.34 The politburo contains at least 
27 members, of whom ten are alternates.35 Prachanda is 
chairman of the politburo's seven-member standing 
committee, whose other members are Mohan Vaidya 
(Kiran), Baburam Bhattarai, Ram Bahadur Thapa (Badal), 
Post Bahadur Bogati (Diwakar), Krishna Bahadur Mahara 
and Dev Gurung. The central committee has nearly 100 
members and has grown as the movement itself has 
expanded: at the second national conference in February 
2001, there were only 55 members. But the increase in 
numbers has not been accompanied by any increase in 
authority: the majority of political and military-strategic 
plans are still formulated by the politburo and the standing 
committee. There is also a central advisory committee of 
senior, experienced political leaders and activists. Regional 
and district commanders underwent a major reshuffle 
during July-August 2005. 
Divisional commands. Beyond the central political bodies, 
the three divisional commands have been granted broad 
authority. The three divisions -- western, special central 
and eastern -- were defined during the June 2002 central 
committee plenary's wide-reaching review of organisational 
structure. The special central command (the Kathmandu 
valley, surrounding hill areas and the Tarai areas of Bara, 
Parsa, Rautahat and others) was dissolved by the August 
2004 plenum to form a new mid-central command. Certain 
areas which had fallen under the special command were 
transferred to the eastern command but most remained with 
the mid-central division.36 The leader of each command -- 
 
 
34 See Appendix B below for details of current central 
committee members. 
35 Crisis Group e-mail correspondence with a Maoist leader, 
April 2005. There are two types of politburo members, full and 
alternate. Full members have voting rights. 
36 Before the creation of the divisional commands, there were 
five regional bureaus directly below the central committee: 
eastern, central, valley, western and expatriate (pravas). Now 
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Maoists use the English term "In-Charge" -- is an ex officio 
member of the standing committee. The radical redrawing 
of command borders was a particular feature of the August 
2004 plenum: as well as shifting the Kathmandu valley 
into the eastern command, it also moved the Rapti area, 
encompassing the Maoist heartland of Rolpa and Rukum, 
into the central command.37 The geographical scope of 
the three commands is now: western central command 
-- Mahakali, Seti, Karnali and Bheri zones; mid central 
command -- Gandaki, Lumbini, Rapti and Dhaulagiri 
zones; eastern central command -- Janakpur, Sagarmatha, 
Bagmati, Narayani, Koshi and Mechi zones.38 
International department. All units of the CPN(M) 
outside Nepal's borders fall under the international 
department, formerly headed by C.P. Gajurel (Gaurav) 
and now by Baburam Bhattarai.39 The latter, accompanied 
by other senior leaders, held meetings in New Delhi in 
late May 2005 with Nepali and Indian political party 
representatives.40 He has also been the main point of 
contact for other international dealings. The international 
department's responsibilities include expanding party 
organisation -- recruiting expatriate Nepalis, establishing 
international contacts and relations, fundraising, purchase 
of ammunition and explosives and arranging training. It 
initially concentrated on trying to build a base among 
Nepalis in India, both permanent residents and temporary 
 
 
the regional bureaus report to the divisional commands, and 
they have increased in number and had their boundaries 
redrawn. Each regional bureau now combines two zones: 
Mechi-Koshi (Gopal Khambu in charge), Narayani-Bagmati 
(Agni Sapkota in charge), Janakpur-Sagarmatha (Mani Thapa 
in charge), Gandak [i.e. Gandaki-Lumbini] (Shakti Bahadur 
Basnet in charge), Rapti-Dhaulagiri special bureau (Netra 
Bikram Chand in charge) [Rapti-Dhaulagiri is described as a 
"special" zone as it encompasses the main Maoist base areas], 
Bheri-Karnali (Khadga Bahadur Bishwakarma in charge) and 
Seti-Mahakali (Lekhraj Bhatta in charge). 
37 Such a demarcation is not only geographically logical -- 
despite being the capital, Kathmandu is indeed towards the east 
of the country -- but also carries a symbolic message. While the 
state's Kathmandu-centric insistence had forced the creation of 
Western, Mid-Western and Far-Western development regions, 
carrying a clear implication of distant hinterlands far removed 
from the capital, the new Maoist arrangement demonstrated that 
previously marginalised areas could now be part of the "centre". 
38 Punya Gautam 'Biswas', "Bidrohiharuko bhitri sanjal", 
Nepal, 23 January 2005. It should be noted that the Maoists 
have redrawn the boundaries of certain districts so that they do 
not necessarily correspond to their official namesakes; there 
have also been disputes between adjacent Maoist autonomous 
governments over their boundaries. 
39 Gaurav was arrested by Indian security forces at Chennai 
airport on 19 August 2003 as the second ceasefire was about to 
collapse. He was reportedly travelling to Europe to represent the 
Maoists and try to present their case to Western governments. 
40 Crisis Group interviews, New Delhi, May 2005. 
migrants. This type of work has now been expanded to 
Europe and North America. 
Other departments. On paper, there are a number of 
further central departments, including policy and direction, 
broadcasting, publishing, schools, human rights, health, 
ethnic, legal and cultural. These structures are designed 
partly to shadow existing state entities and give the 
impression that the Maoists are building a full alternative 
structure. Apart from the sporadically prolific publishing 
department, however, there is little evidence that these 
nominal structures embody the type of full-fledged 
administration that their enumeration is meant to imply. 
Indeed, because of the capture of central leaders -- some 
fifteen are in prison in Nepal and India -- and the killing 
of others, the Maoists' central command is if anything 
understaffed, with gaps in various positions.41 
B. THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY 
The main base of the Maoists' military strength is the 
People's Liberation Army Nepal (PLA). Its strength is 
hard to estimate. At the lower end, some analysts suggest 
that the Maoists have only a few thousand hardcore 
fighters. One military expert and retired RNA lieutenant-
general put their strength at 4,000 armed guerrillas, 5,000 
militia who have received guerrilla training and 20,000 
armed militia.42 The Maoists themselves claim they have 
more than 10,000 armed guerrillas in their nine brigades,43 
a figure that many close observers tend to accept. Indeed, 
the RNA has offered a similar estimate: some 9,500 
guerrillas and 25,000 militia.44 Other experts are more 
cautious, suggesting a range of core fighters anywhere 
from 5,000 to 8,000 or so.  
Of course, the Maoists and the RNA both have reasons to 
give higher estimates. The Maoists obviously want to 
create the impression that they have a mass support base 
and a considerable fighting force. The RNA is faced with 
the problem that earlier state estimates of a small Maoist 
guerrilla cadre simply do not tally with their depiction of 
the current situation. The RNA says that over 8,000 
Maoists have been killed in the conflict so far, more than 
half since the breakdown of the 2003 ceasefire alone.45 If 
 
 
41 Crisis Group telephone interview with a Maoist leader, Nepal, 
March 2005. 
42 Sadip Bahadur Shah, "Bhavishyahin vidroh", Samay, 30 
December 2004. 
43 Crisis Group interview with a Maoist contact, Kathmandu, 
March 2005. 
44 Colonel Victor J.B. Rana, RNA press conference, The 
Kathmandu Post, 21 May 2005. 
45 Brigadier General Dipak Gurung, RNA press conference, 
Kathmandu, 6 May 2005 (in "Over 4,000 Rebels Killed Since 
Aug. '03", nepalnews.com, 6 May 2005) and Major General 
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both this claim and earlier estimates were correct, the 
entire Maoist army should have been killed by now. As 
one analyst commented on similar figures presented by 
the RNA in December 2003: 
Wherever the numbers may lie, the fatalities 
inflicted on the Maoists would tend to suggest that 
the Maoists are now in flight, and the forces of the 
establishment are consolidating their domination 
over the country's hinterland that had, for some 
time, passed into the control of the insurgents. A 
closer analysis of developments, however, reveals 
the spectacle, rather, of a country hurtling towards 
chaos, with the state and its agencies in headlong 
flight.46 
The general headquarters of the PLA is under the leadership 
of Supreme Commander Prachanda. The "general staff" 
consists of the members of the party standing committee. 
The organisational hierarchy under the general 
headquarters is: division, brigade, battalion, company, 
platoon, squad and then militias, poorly armed fighters 
who have not received full guerrilla training. For certain 
areas such as Kathmandu, "special taskforces" have been 
established. These are raised from selected guerrillas either 
to serve in areas where there are no established regular units 
or to carry out more specialised actions from time to time.47 
This elaborate structure is a relatively recent development. 
At the start of their military campaign, the Maoists were 
very limited in number and lacked weaponry and uniforms. 
The first units, which had minimal equipment, were 
organised into "fighting units" (ladaku dal), "security units" 
(suraksha dal) and "volunteer units" (svayamsevak dal). 
According to the then military commander of the Maoists' 
central region, Sandip, the real development of the "people's 
army" only took place after the start of the government's 
Operation Kilo Sierra 2 of May 1998-April 1999.48 
In August 1998, the Maoists' fourth expanded central 
committee meeting (plenum) adopted the slogan of 
building "base areas" and building up military strength 
in order to challenge government repression. The Maoist 
guerrillas became increasingly well organised and well 
trained, until by the start of 2001 they had effectively 
defeated the police. They knew they were not capable of 
fighting with the RNA, however, so, in July 2001, they - 
 
 
Kiran Shumsher Thapa, RNA press briefing, Kathmandu, 20 
May 2005 ("2,100 Scurity Men Killed During Nine Years: 
RNA", Kantipur Online, 20 May 2005). 
46 Ajai Sahni, "How Not to Fight an Insurgency", South Asia 
Intelligence Review 2(21), 8 December 2003. 
47 Crisis Group interview with a company-level PLA 
Commander, Nepalgunj, February 2004. 
48 Interview with Sandip, then company-level PLA commander, 
Nepal Samacharpatra, 17 December 2000. 
reciprocated the government's ceasefire offer and used it 
to strengthen their military capacity, running advanced 
training camps in many locations.49 In September 2001, 
the formation of the "People's Liberation Army Nepal" 
was announced at a gathering of guerrillas from across 
the country in Kureli, Rolpa district. With their forces 
now better organised and trained, they attacked the army 
barracks at Ghorahi, Dang, in November and brought the 
RNA into the war. 
As the guerrilla army grew in size, the central committee 
plenary of June 2002 decided to form brigade-level 
military groupings. In August 2004, these were 
incorporated into three divisions of three brigades each: 
the eastern division under Barshaman Pun (Ananta), the 
central division under Nanda Kishor Pun (Pasang) and the 
western division under Janardan Sharma (Prabhakar). The 
leadership of every fighting unit from company to division 
level is shared between a military commander and a 
political commissar, which the Maoists claim ensures 
political control over the army.50 The commissar ranks 
higher and is in charge of the party committee formed 
within each military unit. All units above section level, 
including special taskforces, are under orders to work 
within the central plan defined by party policy.51 From late 
summer 2005, however, there have been credible reports 
that military and political workers at lower levels will be 
deliberately separated, not least to avoid the demonstrated 
risk of captured Maoists betraying the identities of too many 
comrades.52 
Beyond this, Prachanda announced in August 2004 the aim 
of forming a 100,000-strong people's militia up to the 
company level, under the command of district and regional 
headquarters.53 In practice, militias take their orders from 
different bodies, from local party committees to people's 
governments.54 Militia members are not generally expected 
to carry out the same guerrilla duties as mainstream fighters 
but can be called upon as reinforcements. They are poorly 
armed and do not wear uniforms. 
 
 
49 Video footage from one such training camp in the north of 
Dhading district commanded by Pasang was obtained by the 
RNA and subsequently broadcast on Nepal Television. The 
Maoists themselves filmed training sessions extensively and 
have compiled at least two films of more than an hour each on 
the activities of the PLA, many sections of which date to the 
ceasefire period. These films have not been widely distributed, 
although segments can be viewed at http://cpnm.org/video/Web 
Librery/Final.htm. 
50 Dinesh, "Janamukti senako vikas ra rajnitik karya", Janadesh, 
10 August 2004. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Crisis Group interviews, Nepal, September-October 2005. 
53 Press statement, 1 September 2004. 
54 Dinesh, "Janamukti senako vikas ra rajnitik karya", Janadesh, 
10 August 2004. 
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There have been credible allegations that the Maoists 
carry out forced recruitment and use child soldiers.55 That 
they do indeed carry out coercive recruitment is not in 
doubt. Two of their campaigns in particular -- "one house, 
one guerrilla" and "shoes"56 -- have been widely publicised. 
The Maoists also make no secret of the fact that they give 
military training to children and have militarised the school 
curriculum in areas under their control. Cases of Maoist 
student cadets have been well documented but evidence 
that child soldiers are used in combat is still patchy. 
Similarly plausible allegations that civilians are used as 
human shields surface after most large-scale attacks on 
security bases; again, however, the truth is hard to ascertain 
amid claim and counter-claim.  
C. THE UNITED FRONT 
The concept of the united front was central to Mao's 
thinking and to the communist victory in China. The idea 
is simple in essence but broad, and potentially difficult, in 
application. It means to "unite with all forces that can be 
united with in order to fight a common struggle against 
the enemy and to win in revolution and construction".57 
The key is that the type of forces that can or should be 
united with may vary entirely according to circumstance. 
From the period of the anti-Japanese struggle, Mao 
formulated and continually emphasised the "unity-struggle-
autonomy" policy: "develop the progressive force, win 
over the in-between force, and combat the obstinate 
force".58 The categorisation of such forces depended on 
objectives and interests; the Chinese Communist Party 
went through at least five quite different united front 
experiments.59 
 
 
55 See "Caught in the Middle: Mounting Violations Against 
Children in Nepal's Armed Conflict", Watchlist on Children and 
Armed Conflict, January 2005, available at http://www.watchlist. 
org/reports/nepal.php. Child soldiers have also been the subject 
of international press reporting, such as John Lancaster "Concern 
Grows over Nepal's Child Fighters", The Washington Post, 14 
June 2005. 
56 In the latter, Maoists place a pair of shoes outside the door of 
a house as a sign that one member of the household is expected 
to join the party, normally the military, as a "whole-timer". See 
Kishore Nepal, "The Maoist Service Provision in Parts of Mid 
and Far West Nepal", Centre for Professional Journalism Studies, 
Kathmandu, March 2005. 
57 Kwok-Sing Li (tr. Mary Lok), A Glossary of Political 
Terms of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong, 1995), 
p. 451, emphasis added. 
58 Ibid, p. 452. 
59 The first effort, cooperating with the KMT in the Revolutionary 
National United Front (1924-1927), ended in disaster as Chiang 
Kai Shek ultimately turned on the communists and sought 
to destroy them. It was only after the retreat to the remote 
 
From the start of the 1990s, the Nepali Maoists planned 
the creation of a particular type of united front. It would 
be the least important of the three revolutionary "weapons", 
and it would be a hybrid of the various Chinese models: 
the "revolutionary United Front" would be "an instrument 
of struggle and an embryo of the new power".60 In 
other words, it would not only be a broad coalition of 
organisations assisting in the revolutionary struggle but 
would also function as an embryonic government. Despite 
the existence of a plethora of fraternal organisations created 
alongside the CPN(M) and repeated efforts to build 
bridges with mainstream parties, it is the latter role of the 
united front that has come to predominate in Nepali Maoist 
discourse. 
Nepal's Maoists bitterly criticised existing "reformist 
trends" within the communist movement that "focus on 
the legal movement and put emphasis only on forging 
unity-in-action with the various reactionary and Right 
revisionist political groups and of sectarian and mechanistic 
trends that only create noises by mechanistically forging 
[a] 'united front' of their Party cadres alone".61 A true 
revolutionary united front should bring together "anti-
feudal and anti-imperialist patriotic, democratic and leftist 
forces as an instrument of developing class struggles.…The 
principle function of such a front should be to develop 
struggles on the basis of people's problems that would 
gradually break the [limits of] law and the system. At the 
initial stages, the effective form of such a front would be 
confined to rural areas and at the local level".62 
As the Maoists approached the launch of the people's war, 
they defined a narrow role for the united front, with its 
component elements strictly subordinated to the party: 
"Armed struggle will be carried out by uniting all strata 
and categories of anti-feudal and anti-imperialist masses 
of the people under the leadership of the Party".63 Within 
three years the armed insurgency had expanded 
significantly, prompting consideration of formalising the 
united front under the rubric of the "Central Organizing 
 
 
countryside and the Long March that the communists were 
able to form an anti-Japanese front (1937-1945), which fought 
successfully to liberate China from the invaders. From the end 
of the second world war to the communist victory of 1949, 
the targets of the united front were obstructive external forces, 
the U.S. and USSR; once in power the objective was the 
transformation of the bourgeoisie; once the upheavals of the 
Cultural Revolution were over, the party leadership projected 
the image of a "New Era Patriotic United Front". 
60 "Political Line of CPN (Unity Centre)", op. cit. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 "Theoretical Premises for the Historic Initiation of the 
People's War", op. cit. 
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Committee of the People's Republic of Nepal".64 Its role 
would still be to mobilise "various left, progressive, 
patriotic and democratic forces" but it would be explicitly 
transitional: "[S]uch a central formation will principally 
work as a means of struggle for the time being and will 
work secondarily as a means of power". In this, it partially 
reflects the "people's democratic front" of the early People's 
Republic of China, which was meant to help fulfil 
fundamental state tasks and oppose internal and external 
enemies.65 In September 2001, during the first ceasefire, 
the Maoists created a 37-member United Revolutionary 
People's Council (URPC) as such a front. It was headed 
by Baburam Bhattarai, with Krishna Bahadur Mahara as 
assistant convenor and Dev Gurung as secretary.66 
The Maoists have established a range of fraternal 
organisations to boost their popularity by carrying out 
above-ground political activities and mobilisation on 
their behalf. By 2000, there were more than twenty 
such organisations.67 Before the declaration of a state of 
emergency in November 2001, they carried out open 
or semi-underground activities. The most influential 
has been the All-Nepal National Free Students Union 
(Revolutionary) led by Lekhnath Neupane. Other active 
organisations include the Nepal Trade Union Federation 
(Revolutionary) led by Salikram Jamarkattel; the All-
Nepal Women's Association (Revolutionary) led by 
Jayapuri Gharti; the All-Nepal Janajati Federation led by 
Suresh Ale Magar; the All Nepal Peasants Association 
(Revolutionary); the All-Nepal Teacher's Organisation 
(Revolutionary) led by Gunaraj Lohani; the Nepal 
National Intellectuals Organisation and the All-Nepal 
People's Cultural Union led by Mani Thapa; and the All 
Nepal Peasants Association led by Shivaraj Gautam.68 
 
 
64 "Experiences of the People's War and Some Important 
Questions", op. cit.  
65 The Preamble to the Constitution of the People's Republic of 
China states that "In the course of the great struggle to establish 
the People's Republic of China, the people of our country forged 
a broad people's democratic united front, composed of all 
democratic classes, democratic parties and groups, and popular 
organisations, and led by the Communist Party of China. This 
people's democratic front will continue to play its part in 
mobilising and rallying the whole people in common struggle 
to fulfil the fundamental task of the state during the transition [to 
socialism] and to oppose enemies within and without". Documents 
of the First Session of the First National People's Congress of 
the People's Republic of China (Peking, 1955), p. 134. 
66 Press statement of URPC, 26 November 2001. 
67 "Report of the High Level Recommendation Committee 
on Resolution of the Maoist Problem", 2000, His Majesty's 
Government Nepal, p. 12. 
68 Compiled from different media sources, including 
www.cpnm.org. 
These organisations, termed "people's class organisations" 
(janvargiya sangathan) by the Maoists, are not strictly 
speaking part of a united front but ancillary wings of the 
party structure. They follow its direction and act as 
subsidiaries with specialised tasks or support bases. 
They are also useful as a way of drawing recruits into 
underground activities via semi-open groups that operate 
at a slight distance from the central party. New members 
of the CPN(M) tend to have been inducted from such 
groups, especially if they have earned a reputation for 
good work in them.  
Apart from the students union -- the ANNFSU(R) -- all 
these organisations were formed after the start of the 
insurgency, and their contributions have been patchy. 
The ANNFSU(R) demonstrated the Maoists' reach in 
urban areas for the first time with a strike which shut 
down more than 30,000 schools across the country in 
November 2000. It further expanded its activities from 
the period of the first ceasefire in 2001, targeting the 
inefficiencies and inequities of the education system, in 
particular the fee-paying private schools which had 
mushroomed after 1990. Its campaigns to reduce private 
school fees were a clever tactical move that won support 
from a large lower middle class struggling to educate its 
children. The ANNFSU(R) claims a large membership 
but does not have an established structure in urban 
schools and colleges. Nevertheless, it continues to make 
political interventions, often school shutdowns. 
The other organisation that has recently gained an 
active profile is the Nepal Trade Union Federation 
(Revolutionary), which brings together some dozen 
nominal unions.69 Its main task is to advance Maoist aims 
through industrial action and to mobilise a support base 
by organising labourers in various sectors of the formal 
economy. Its leaders and members have also reportedly 
played an important role in collecting "donations" from 
industrialists and businessmen in Kathmandu, Biratnagar 
and Birgunj.70 It was initially said to be behind scattered 
incidents of extortion, vandalism and bomb explosions but 
it gained a wider reputation in September 2004 when it 
forced the shutdown of twelve major businesses over 
labour conditions and complaints about the foreign capital 
 
 
69 These unions include the All Nepal Carpet Workers Union, 
All Nepal Transport Workers Union, All Nepal Hotel and 
Restaurant Workers Union, All Nepal Construction Workers 
Union, All Nepal Meter Tempo Workers Union, All Nepal 
Press Workers Union, All Nepal Thangka Art Workers Union, 
All Nepal Painters Union, Nepal Shop Workers Union, Nepal 
Progressive Newspaper Vendors Union and Himalayan Trekking 
Workers Union. 
70 Crisis Group interviews with Royal Nepalese Army officials, 
Kathmandu, March 2005. 
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and exploitive multinational corporations.71 It enforced its 
strike with a minor bomb attack on the grounds of the 
five-star Soaltee Hotel, which hurt the tourism sector and 
also served as a symbolic attack against the royal family, 
which is closely linked to the hotel.72 
However, the Maoists have yet to attempt the type of 
united front politics that was decisive in the Chinese 
revolution. Creating their own support organisations 
is not the same as persuading forces with different aims to 
join them in a shared task for limited common objectives. 
The main reason for this has probably been the Maoists' 
compulsion to eliminate political rivalry across the 
countryside by targeting other parties' activists. This has 
not created fertile ground for the kind of understanding 
that would be necessary to build a viable working alliance 
with other political groups. Nor, until the royal coup 
in February 2005, was there sufficient feeling within 
the mainstream parties that any collaboration with 
the Maoists could be safe or profitable. The Maoists' 
subsequent efforts to work with the mainstream parties 
will be the first, and probably most crucial, test of whether 
they can build a true united front. 
 
 
71 Mukul Humagain, "Arthatantra dhwasta banaune niyat", 
Nepal, 29 August 2004. 
72 "Rebels force Nepal firms to close", BBC News, 17 August 
2004, available at http://newswww.bbc.net.uk/2/hi/south_asia/ 
3571884.stm. 
IV. LEADERSHIP, SUPPORT BASE 
AND RESOURCES 
A. LEADERSHIP, COMMAND AND CONTROL 
The Maoists are in general disciplined and united but still 
face problems in controlling their large movement. Since 
the CPN(M) was formed in 1995 it has not suffered a 
single split; in contrast, each of the major mainstream 
parties has been fractured at least once. Prachanda is 
unlikely to face a serious challenge to his monopoly on 
power within the party. Apart from Baburam Bhattarai, 
there are no other leaders of a stature sufficient to present 
a threat to his authority; Bhattarai himself has repeatedly 
insisted he has no designs on the leadership and may have 
been chastened by the disciplinary action he underwent in 
early 2005. But maintaining such discipline requires 
constant effort. Senior leaders spend significant time 
dealing with policy debates and trying to prevent 
disagreements from becoming damaging. According 
to the RNA, this has had a direct effect on operational 
effectiveness by distracting attention from the 
implementation of plans and strategy.73 
There are other tensions within the party but none at 
the moment pose a grave threat to its unity or operational 
capacity. The most obvious area of current and potential 
divisions is the relationship between the party and the 
various ethnic front organisations. In 2004 there were 
notable splits in Saptari, where Maoist leader Jay Krishna 
Goit separated from the Madhesi National Liberation 
Front, and in the eastern hills, where there were several 
defections from the Kirat National Liberation Front. 
These received significant press attention but the Maoists 
insist they are unlikely to cause serious damage to the 
movement.74 However, the fact that similar disputes have 
flared up again in the months following the royal coup 
suggests they do indeed represent a serious challenge.75 
The arrest of many senior leaders has caused the Maoists 
more serious problems. Among the fifteen central level 
cadres in prison in India are Mohan Vaidya (Kiran), a 
senior ideologue and respected figure who has in the past 
helped smooth over differences between Prachanda and 
Bhattarai, and C.P. Gajurel (Gaurav), who was working 
on the international front before being caught in Chennai 
 
 
73 See the assessment of Major General Kiran Shumsher Thapa 
published in Annapurna Post, 21 May 2005. 
74 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, March 2005. 
75 September 2005 saw reports of Maoist disarray in Tehrathum 
(Crisis Group e-mail communication) and of a "rebellion" by 
Madhesi cadres against the party "high command" ("Madhesi 
Maoists Revolt Against Party", The Himalayan Times, 20 
September 2005). 
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trying to fly to London on a fake British passport. Other 
imprisoned colleagues were also carrying out significant 
tasks, and their loss has affected Maoist capacity.76 Two 
important leaders were arrested in India and handed over 
to Nepal: Matrika Yadav, whose role was central in the 
Maoist expansion and mobilisation in the Tarai, and 
Suresh Ale Magar, a figurehead for ethnic activists within 
the movement. Since the Maoist unilateral ceasefire 
declaration of 3 September 2005, a number of mid-level 
commanders have been arrested, some apparently through 
their carelessness.77 
Many of the most capable Maoist leaders have been killed. 
Alternate politburo member Suresh Wagle (Basu) was 
killed by police in Gorkha on 8 September 1999; central 
leader Dandapani Neupane (Dipendra Sharma) 
disappeared from Kathmandu on 21 May 1999 and is 
assumed to have been killed; regional level leader and 
pro-Maoist journalist Krishna Sen was killed in police 
custody during the first emergency in 2001; central 
committee member Rit Bahadur Khadka (Pratap), of 
Dolakha district, was killed in Rautahat in July 2002; 
central committee members Mohan Chandra Gautam 
(Kumar) and Sherman Kunwar (Vishal) were killed in 
Siraha in 5 September 2004.78 On 13 May 2004, central 
committee member and brigade commander Nep Bahadur 
K.C. (Parivartan) died in an accident,79 and in March 
2005 central committee member and Satbariya Second 
Brigade commander Jit was killed in a military clash in 
Bardiya.80 
There have also been surrenders, in particular after the 
RNA was deployed, such as of brigade commander Hom 
Prakash Shrestha (Himal), battalion commanders Jaya 
Bahadur Gharti (Prabhat) and Man Bahadur Malla 
(Sangharsh) and company commander Janu Chhantyal 
(Pratap).81 Political workers who have surrendered include 
regional bureau members Khop Bahadur Kandel, Ravi 
Karki and Mandavraj Karki. 
 
 
76 They include competent party managers such as Kul Prasad 
K.C., Hit Bahadur Tamang, Lokendra Bista, Dilip Maharjan, 
Chitra Narayan Shrestha and Anil Sharma. 
77 For example, security forces arrested 14th battalion commissar 
Umesh Shrestha (Anil), Khotang district in-charge Ganesh 
Karki (Prabhat) and ANNFSU(R) central committee member 
Ratna Dhakal in Kathmandu in September-October 2005. Saptari 
district in-charge Shivaram Yadav (Subash) was also arrested 
on 1 October 2005 in Kachandaha, Saptari district. 
78 Vishal, whose home was in Sindhuli, was the commissar 
of the Solu-Salleri Sixth Brigade. 
79 Prachanda, press statement, 5 June 2004. 
80 Jit was the second brigade commander to be killed by the 
RNA. 
81 All these Maoists commanders were produced by the RNA 
during a press meeting. See, Nepal, 30 January 2004. 
Surrenders and defections have taken place from most 
lower party levels but they do not seem to have extended 
to the central level. However, central committee members 
Rabindra Shrestha, Rekha Sharma, Mumaram Khanal, 
Krishnadhvaj Khadka and Bamdev Chhetri were accused 
by the party of "weakness" while in state custody in 2001; 
Sharma, Khadka and Khanal have not been rehabilitated, 
and Khanal has publicly declared that he is no longer 
associated with the CPN(M).82 
The writ of Prachanda still runs throughout the Maoist 
movement, and central-level decisions are fed down to 
the regional, district and village levels. There have been 
no major disruptions to this chain of command, so to this 
extent the movement remains united and disciplined. The 
reason is a well organised national command structure 
firmly in the grip of the central leadership. Numerous 
accounts of strong central management illustrate this, 
such as the cautionary tale of local Maoists who tried to 
make money out of the medicinal yarcha gumba83 trade: 
"At one point several years ago, local Maoists inserted 
themselves as intermediary dealers and profited from the 
larger transactions. When the Maoist leadership learned 
of this practice, they stopped it, returned the trade to its 
traditional private dealers, and confiscated and remitted 
the ill-gotten gains to the Maoist central treasury".84 
But many observers question the firmness of central control, 
pointing to incidents where local commanders appear 
to be working against higher-level policies or simply in 
ignorance of them. The party has also taken action against 
cadres for carelessness or mistakes but such disciplinary 
measures are normally only publicised if there is particular 
pressure. This was the case with the killing of Dailekh 
journalist Dekendra Raj Thapa on 11 August 2004. It was 
only after intense national and international criticism that 
the then Maoist western central commander Diwakar was 
compelled to explain the murder. He claimed that Thapa 
was not just a journalist but also an informer, who had 
caused the deaths of a number of people. But there had 
been a mistake: according to Maoist central policy "any 
journalist guilty of such serious crimes could be arrested 
but capital punishment should not be carried out".85 He 
announced that the party had ordered an inquiry but no 
 
 
82 Interview with Mumaram Khanal, Nepal, 8 May 2005. 
83 Yarcha gumba (cordyceps sinensis) is a highly valued 
traditional medicine found in the Nepal Himalaya and exported 
to India and China. 
84 Robert Gersony, "Sowing the Wind: History and Dynamics 
of the Maoist Revolt in Nepal's Rapti Hills", report submitted 
to Mercy Corps International, October 2003, p. 14, available at 
http://www.mercycorps.org/items/1662/. 
85 Diwakar, in charge of the CPN(M) western central command, 
press statement, 21 August 2004. 
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results have been published other than a short statement on 
their website. 
One reason for cases of indiscipline is the degree of 
autonomy granted to lower levels of the party. A certain 
amount of decision-making power is devolved to 
committees and other regional bodies according to their 
status. In particular, the three divisional commands 
theoretically have significant freedom to decide their own 
programs and plans of action in line with overall policy. 
But as their leadership is drawn from the standing 
committee, there is little likelihood of them taking a line 
that has not been agreed upon at the top level.86 
Local and district committees are granted the authority 
to decide on military targets and assassinations but the 
misuse of this authority has been a recurring feature.87 
The most sensitive part of the Maoist movement, the 
military, has so far not known significant internal 
indiscipline or anarchy.88 This is partly due to the system 
of dual military/political leadership: while commanders 
lead guerrillas in action, the commissars' party rank is 
higher. The requirement for significant decisions to be 
taken by commander and commissar jointly reduces the 
likelihood of indiscipline. 
Frequent claims that the Maoists have descended into 
anarchy or are "running amok" seem to be exaggerated 
and are denied by their military command. However, the 
Maoists suffer from a widespread problem of individual 
indiscipline. This is partly due to their rapid expansion. In 
the early years their cadres would be carefully selected, 
screened and educated in Marxist and Maoist doctrine 
before being given responsibilities. This created a small 
but politically focused and disciplined group. 
But as the movement grew rapidly, especially with the 
need for increased recruitment once the RNA was 
mobilised, the process of careful selection was more or 
less abandoned. The average age of party cadres, whether 
on the political or military front, was also lowered. As 
a result, indiscipline and related problems have greatly 
increased. The Maoist dictum used to be "it is ideas that 
control the gun, not the gun that controls ideas" but for 
many cadres the gun seems to have grown more powerful. 
In recognition of the problem, internal corrective measures 
have been taken from time to time. 
 
 
86 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, March 2005. 
87 Crisis Group interview with a Maoist cadre, Nepalgunj, 
February 2004. Such decisions are taken collectively by a 
committee or military commission but the secretary, commander 
and commissar have the major roles. 
88 "Declaration of PLA", document passed by the first national 
conference of the People's Liberation Army, September 2001. 
It does not appear that the Maoists have reached a 
command and control crisis but they clearly face 
difficulties. A large and diffuse movement which has 
doubtless attracted a fair share of criminal elements poses 
inherent management challenges. The loss of senior leaders 
through death, arrest or internal disputes has hampered 
their capacity. Internal tensions have a particularly 
damaging effect on general morale as well as operational 
effectiveness. It is surely no coincidence that the Maoists 
suffered several significant military defeats during the 
period of intense speculation over the possible breakdown 
of the Prachanda-Baburam partnership in early 2005. 
B. MEMBERSHIP AND SUPPORT BASE 
The Maoist movement could not have grown to the extent 
it has without mobilising a significant support base, even 
if it remains only a small percentage of Nepal's population. 
The RNA, for example, estimates that beyond their armed 
cadres and 14,000 political workers, the Maoists may 
have some 100,000 supporters.89 The Maoists, obviously, 
would claim a far greater number, and there is certainly a 
larger category of latent sympathisers as well as committed 
supporters. Retired RNA Lieutenant-General Sadip 
Bahadur Shah estimates 24,000 active supporters and 
200,000 sympathisers.90 
A number of surveys have indicated that while the Maoists 
might only win a low percentage of votes in a free and 
fair election, a much wider constituency agrees with their 
aims but not their means. Overall, there are three categories 
of supporters: committed "whole-timers", who have gone 
underground and take part in either military or political 
work; supporters, who provide assistance in a number of 
ways but are not declared Maoists and operate above 
ground; and sympathisers, who offer little if any practical 
help and may include those who are dissatisfied with 
Maoist violence but nevertheless back their political 
agenda.91 
1. Class 
Before launching their armed struggle the Maoists made a 
class analysis of the motivating forces on which they could 
hope to draw. They identified six broad classes from whom 
they could expect some support: the proletariat, poor 
peasants, middle peasants, rich peasants, petty bourgeoisie 
 
 
89 Colonel Victor J.B. Rana, RNA press conference, The 
Kathmandu Post, 21 May 2005. 
90 Sadip Bahadur Shah, "Bhavishyahin vidroh", Samay, 30 
December 2004. 
91 Crisis Group interviews with Maoist organisers and other 
political party workers, 2004 and 2005. 
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and national bourgeoisie.92 The latter three were expected 
to be only "vacillating allies", although the Maoists saw 
the petty bourgeoisie as playing a potentially "important 
auxiliary role". They also noted that "imperialists" and 
"reactionary forces" were concentrating on co-opting 
intellectuals. 
Like traditional Marxists, the Maoists believe that although 
the Nepali proletariat is small, it remains "the most 
revolutionary class" and still bears the "historical 
responsibility of identifying and giving leadership to other 
allied classes". They concluded that the main motivating 
force, however, would be a mix of rural and urban workers: 
"farm workers, bonded labourers, landless peasants, 
porters, and poor peasants, and in our case in the cities 
the cart pullers, rickshaw pullers, drivers of tempos, taxis, 
and transport and hotel workers, etc." Interestingly, the 
middle peasants were also singled out both for the fact 
that they survive with difficulty despite owning land and 
because they outnumber other classes in the hills.93 
While these were the primary class categories for the 
Maoists to work with, they were assisted by the fact that 
other communist groups had built up a base of cadres 
schooled in Marxism. The Maoists were able to benefit 
through defections from the discontent of some members 
of mainstream communist parties. According to one 
Maoist leader, this was particularly the case with 
disaffected UML cadres in the east of the country.94 This 
ideologically sophisticated core was instrumental in 
helping the Maoists in their early expansion. 
Many of the Maoists' early campaigns also helped them 
win broader sympathy. For people long ignored by central 
government and conscious of the unequal development of 
the country, the Maoists seemed to offer new hope. The 
first experiments in "people's court" justice won support 
when exploitive moneylenders and landowners were 
punished, while campaigns against alcohol abuse and 
domestic violence painted the Maoists in a bold, reformist 
light. However, the novelty of these campaigns wore off, 
and their doubtful efficacy has limited their ability to 
boost Maoist strength. 
2. Ethnicity and caste 
The wide participation of otherwise excluded ethnic and 
caste groups is a notable feature of the Maoist movement.95 
 
 
92 "Strategy and Tactics of Armed Struggle in Nepal", op. cit. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Interview with Ananta, Commander of PLA's eastern 
division, Janadesh, 16 December 2003. 
95 Sudheer Sharma, "The Ethnic Dimension of the Maoist 
Insurgency", May 2002 (unpublished report made available 
to Crisis Group), p. 26.  
But participation has not translated into control at the 
top levels. The concentration in Rolpa and Rukum of 
independent-minded Magars, well aware of their historic 
exclusion from the Nepali state, was one of the factors that 
made this a suitable crucible for Maoist mobilisation. But 
there have been repeated accusations that young people 
from minority communities have been cynically 
manipulated by the leadership and used as little more than 
cannon-fodder. 
There are only two members of ethnic minority 
communities -- Ram Bahadur Thapa and newly appointed 
Dev Gurung -- in the seven-member Maoist standing 
committee. Other bodies are more representative. Of the 
URPC's 37 members, twenty are from ethnic and dalit 
(outcast) communities, while there were eleven members 
of ethnic and dalit communities in the sixteen-member 
United People's Front, dissolved in 2000. There is also 
a significant presence of ethnic, dalit and Tarai leaders 
in the central committee.96 Whatever the composition 
of the leadership, the fact that the Maoists have made 
an apparently serious commitment to minority rights -- 
something neither the palace nor the mainstream parties 
have ever been able to bring themselves to do97 -- means 
that they offer an alternative that many in such 
communities, especially the radicalised and disillusioned 
youth, find attractive. 
3. Women 
The Maoists have made a particular effort to appeal to 
women and to recruit them as active participants in their 
movement.98 Gender equality has always been a feature 
 
 
96 For example, Dev Gurung, Ram Bahadur Thapa, Man Bahadur 
Thapa, Suresh Ale Magar, Matrika Yadav, Nanda Kishore Pun, 
Barshaman Pun, Ram Charan Chaudhari, Chitra Narayan 
Shrestha, Rabindra Shrestha, Hisila Yami, Santosh Budha 
Magar, Purna Bahadur Gharti, Kumari Moktan, Hitman Shakya, 
Hit Bahadur Tamang. 
97 Crisis Group will examine this failure in detail in subsequent 
reporting on the mainstream political parties. 
98 The topic of women in the Maoist movement will be examined 
in its own right in subsequent Crisis Group reporting. Maoist 
women themselves, most notably Hisila Yami (Parvati), have 
written on the subject. See, for example, Hisila Yami and 
Baburam Bhattarai, Marxbad ra mahila mukti (Marxism and 
Women's Emancipation) (Utprerak Prakashan, 2000) and Parvati, 
"Women's Participation in the People's War" in Arjun Karki 
and David Seddon (eds.), The People's War in Nepal: Left 
Perspectives (Delhi, 2003). Prachanda has also published an 
article, "Problem of Women's Emancipation and the Need of 
Today", in Problems and Prospects of Revolution in Nepal, op. 
cit. Non-Maoist perspectives are available in Shobha Gautam, 
Amrita Banskota and Rita Manchanda, "Women in the Maoist 
Insurgency in Nepal", in Thapa (ed.), op. cit., pp. 93-124 and 
Mandira Sharma and Dinesh Prasain, "Gender Dimensions 
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of their political program. In the appeal that marked the 
start of the insurgency, the CPN(M) complained that 
"whereas this state has been treating women as second-
class citizens for long, now it has intensified rape, 
trafficking and the process of commoditisation through 
advertisements, against them".99 The URPC devoted 
a separate section to women and family in its policy 
manifesto, promising that under Maoist rule, "all forms of 
patriarchal exploitation of women shall be ended, and 
women shall be given all rights equal to men. Like son, 
daughter shall enjoy equal rights to parental property. 
Women shall be provided with special rights for 
participating in all organs of the state".100 They also vowed 
to eradicate commercial sex work, take harsh action against 
traffickers, permit only marriage by mutual consent, permit 
abortion and give special consideration to women in 
divorce proceedings.101 
Women have been inducted into all areas of the party, 
army and front organisations. It has been estimated that 
they constitute anywhere between 30 and 40 per cent of 
the Maoist guerrilla force.102 The Maoist women's 
organisation, the All-Nepal Women's Union 
(Revolutionary), has led campaigns against alcohol and 
domestic violence. It was particularly active around the 
time of the 2001 ceasefire but the arrest of its then leader, 
Rekha Sharma, and other senior figures caused severe 
disruption. In 2003 Jayapuri Gharti, a central committee 
member from Rolpa, was appointed the new chair of the 
organisation, and it has started to work more in rural 
areas. The Maoists have a stated policy of including as 
many women as possible in each military unit. According 
to their leaders, by 2000 there were many female squad 
commanders and deputy commanders, and in some areas 
there were all-women guerrilla units.103 According to 
Hisila Yami (Parvati), by early 2004 women formed a 
third of the PLA and were represented up to the levels of 
vice-commander and commissar at the battalion level.104 
However, women still have a long way to go if they are to 
approach equality even within the Maoist movement itself. 
There are very few women in the central committee and 
politburo and not one on the powerful standing committee. 
The only politburo members are Pampha Bhusal and 
Hisila Yami, who faces disciplinary action. On the central 
committee, the remaining women members are Jayapuri 
 
 
of the People's War" in Michael Hutt (ed.), Himalayan 'People's 
War' (London, 2004), pp. 152-65. 
99 "Appeal of the C.P.N. (Maoist)", op. cit. 
100 Common Minimum Policy and Program of the URPC. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Mandira Sharma and Dinesh Prasain, op. cit., p. 154. 
103 Yami and Bhattarai, op. cit., p. 66. 
104 Parvati, "Women's Participation in People's Army", The 
Worker, No. 9, February 2004. 
Gharti, Uma Bhujel, Kumari Moktan and Rekha Sharma 
(who is also apparently under disciplinary action). As 
many observers commented at the time, the lack of women 
on the Maoist negotiating team during talks with the 
government in 2003 seemed to belie the movement's 
rhetorical commitments. 
While the Maoists certainly have brought about a degree 
of change in the role of women and attitudes towards them, 
it has not all been positive. The most significant result of 
conflict-induced rural depopulation has been that as men 
have left, women have been burdened with an even larger 
share of work than before. And the durability of other 
reform is yet to be tested. As one report, which details 
many Maoist-led improvements, cautions, "…change 
seems to have taken place due to Maoist action or threat 
of action. Only through continuous reinforcement of these 
positive practices by local people will they become 
sustainable social norms and values".105 
4. Prospects 
The Maoists' early gains in public image and sympathy 
have not been sustained; most observers believe they have 
been significantly eroded during a period when the public 
has come to view all the actors in the conflict -- the 
monarchy, the Maoists and the political parties -- in an 
increasingly harsh light. When asked what popular support 
the Maoists might enjoy, a veteran communist activist 
said, "four or five years back they might even have won 
50 per cent in a vote, two years ago maybe 20 or 30 per 
cent, but now I don't think they'd even get 10 per cent".106 
Such assessments are based on the perception that the 
innocent idealism which encouraged passive support for 
the Maoists in the earlier stages of the conflict has worn 
off as the movement has shown continued brutality 
without delivering on its seemingly progressive agenda. 
The Maoists have been more successful at mobilising 
support in rural areas than in the towns. The urban revolt 
called for by the "Prachandapath" strategy adopted in 
2001 has proved a damp squib.107 Even radical students 
in the towns and cities still prefer to work within the 
mainstream parties, and the Maoists have not made any 
major breakthrough in general backing. The relative 
ease with which the royal government since February 
2005 has broken the power of the Maoist bandh (general 
strike) in Kathmandu indicates the lack of committed 
support in the capital. 
 
 
105 Mukta S. Lama-Tamang, Sumitra M. Gurung, Dharma 
Swarnakar and Sita Rana Magar, "Social Change in Conflict 
Affected Areas: Assessment Report", prepared for the UK 
Department for International Development, August 2003, p. 23. 
106 Crisis Group interview, New Delhi, April 2005. 
107 See section  V.A.2 below for an outline of Prachandapath. 
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Meanwhile, the increased resort to coercive recruitment 
seems to indicate the hollowness of the Maoist support 
base. This does not necessarily affect their ability to 
continue fighting -- for that they only need to sustain their 
core cadre of guerrillas and political workers -- but it may 
affect their strategy and their calculations on the benefits 
or drawbacks of entering electoral politics. 
C. RESOURCES 
The Maoists have managed to find sufficient resources to 
maintain the various facets of their movement. Fighters 
have been provided with weapons and ammunition, and 
the political campaign has been sustained with significant 
funding. It is not possible to give a full picture of Maoist 
resource mobilisation but the following sections outline 
their pattern of operation. 
1. Finances 
The CPN(M) is Nepal's richest political party. Accurately 
estimating Maoist income and expenditure is difficult, 
primarily because of the nature of the movement itself 
but also because much of their support, such as forced 
donations for food or accommodation, comes in kind rather 
than cash. What figures are available on Maoist finances 
tend to be scattered and not always reliable. Most income 
is dedicated to running the party and military activities, of 
which supporting thousands of full-time workers forms 
a large proportion. Little money seems to be allotted 
to building administrative capacities or carrying out 
development work. 
According to a study based on direct interviews with 
Maoist fighters, it costs Rs. 17,000 (approximately $250) 
annually to provide one armed guerrilla with clothes and 
other basic necessities.108 This excludes the cost of food, 
accommodation, weapons and ammunition and medical 
treatment which, whether in cash or kind, add up to many 
times this amount. Other sources agree that guerrillas are 
not paid a salary but are given a monthly allowance of Rs. 
150 per month (just over $2) for basic items such as soap 
and toothpaste.109 
Given the scale of the Maoist movement, the resources 
needed to sustain its political and military operations are 
on a scale far beyond that of any other party. Even in early 
2002, a former Maoist district commander estimated that 
"the Maoists need to spend about Rs. 10 million (almost 
$150,000) every month to keep the war going: for 
 
 
108 Ujir Magar, "Maobadiko yuddha kharcha", Nepal, 4 July 
2004. 
109 Rajendra Dahal and Mohan Mainali (ed.), Bandukko bojh 
(Kathmandu, 2004) , p. 101. 
the upkeep of their own guerrilla force, logistics and 
hardware".110 This did not include political and 
administrative expenses, and the movement has grown 
significantly in the past three years. 
The Maoists' main sources of funds are bank robbery, 
donations and extortion.111 Of these, the former has 
become more difficult as banks have increased security, 
and in most rural districts all deposits are moved to army 
bases at night for safekeeping.112 Nevertheless, raids 
continue, with the Maoists claiming to have netted almost 
$6,000 in one bank robbery in June 2005 in Bardiya 
district.113 Despite a crackdown on Maoist fundraising 
since February 2005, extortion continues.114 Secret 
contributors to the Maoists include not only businessmen, 
industrialists and traders but also senior politicians and 
civil servants.115 In the rural areas under their sway, the 
Maoists collect "taxes" from individuals with a cash 
income, such as teachers,116 and seasonal donations in 
kind, such as portions of the harvest, from farmers. Rates 
of "tax" on incomes vary from 5 to 25 per cent.117 Tourism 
has also become a source of cash for the Maoists, who levy 
compulsory contributions on trekkers of most popular 
mountain routes. 
As the insurgency has progressed, Maoist networks in 
India and overseas have tried to build up their own 
fundraising capacity. It is impossible to estimate the 
significance of these, and most funds channelled into 
the country would, like the vast majority of regular 
remittances, follow unofficial routes. But Maoists based 
in Western Europe say they have been able to raise funds 
individually or through support organisations.118 In 
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111 From bank robberies between February 1996 and May 
2003 alone, the Maoists are estimated to have seized over $4.6 
million in cash and precious metals (Dahal and Mainali, op. 
cit., p.105). 
112 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu and other districts, 
January-May 2005. 
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Krishna Sen News Agency, 10 June 2005. 
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Kathmandu Post, 26 April 2005. 
115 Crisis Group interview with a security official, Kathmandu, 
December 2004. 
116 According to the Nepal National Teacher's Organisation, 
there are almost 143,000 teachers employed in government 
schools in Nepal, of whom the majority work in rural areas 
and are forced to pay 5 to 25 per cent of their monthly salary. 
See, Dahal and Mainali, op. cit., p.105. 
117 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, January 2005. 
118 Crisis Group interviews with Maoist cadres in London, 
Brussels and Frankfurt, January-February 2005. Interviewees 
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comparison to external sources, the amounts raised from 
among Maoist cadres themselves are minimal. 
Apart from centralised efforts, the Maoist regional 
autonomous governments have been instructed to seek 
financial self-sufficiency by raising their own levies. 
This has led to the identification of natural resources as 
potential revenue opportunities. As the head of the Seti-
Mahakali government explains, "the resources for running 
our government come from taxes on the natural resources 
available in our region (such as herbs and timber), trade 
duties and voluntary contributions from various 
professionals and the ordinary working population".119 
Medicinal herbs are a particularly lucrative option in the 
Rapti, Bheri and Karnali regions, where one people's 
government official claimed that the then "special district 
people's government" brought in more than $7,300 
annually.120 
The seasonal trade in valuable yarcha gumba is especially 
profitable. In 2003, a Maoist cadre claimed that tax had 
been collected in Dolpa on 1,300 kilograms of yarcha 
gumba at a rate of $74 per kilogram. One international 
official reported Maoist earnings on yarcha gumba 
exported to India from Darchula district in the summer of 
2004 to be in the range of $600,000.121 The Maoists have 
also been accused of profiting from trade in marijuana. 
The U.S. has stated that "Maoist guerrillas are involved in 
drug smuggling to finance their insurgency.…[Nepal's] 
Narcotic Drug Control Law Enforcement Unit reports 
that the Maoists levy a 40 per cent tax on cannabis 
production in certain areas".122 However, any income 
from narcotics is likely to be minimal and, given that Nepal 
is not a producer of hard drugs, unlikely to develop into a 
major source. Fears that Nepal will follow a Latin American 
or Afghan model of narco-insurgency are unfounded. 
The Maoists have proved more than proficient in 
marshalling sufficient resources to sustain their campaign 
to date, primarily by illegal and coercive means. The fact 
that they do not, as far as can be ascertained, rely on 
significant inputs from overseas makes them more resilient 
as there is no simple cash pipeline that can be cut off. But 
it also affects their strategy: as long as they depend 
on living off a percentage of Nepal's overall economic 
turnover, they have no incentive to undermine the 
economy dramatically. A total collapse, or the destruction 
 
 
119 Interview with Lekhraj Bhatta, Janadesh, 20 April 2004. 
120 Interview with Samil Pun Magar, member of then special 
district people's government, Janadesh, 11 May 2004. 
121 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, September 2004. 
122 "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report", Annual 
Report of U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, March 2005, http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/ 
nrcrpt/2005/vol1/html/42366.htm. 
of particular industries such as tourism, would have serious 
knock-on effects for the Maoists' own income. Ironically, 
therefore, the Maoists have an important stake in ensuring 
that the economy continues to function. 
As national dependence on income from migrant workers 
in other Asian countries and the Middle East increases, the 
Maoists appear to be concentrating on claiming a proportion 
of remittances. Meanwhile, the Nepali government 
unintentionally helps to sustain the Maoists, with 
proportions of education, health and rural development 
budgets regularly finding their way into the CPN(M)'s 
coffers. And the Maoists' generally conciliatory attitude 
towards international aid is likely to continue: not only do 
internationally funded development projects deliver some 
services to rural areas that the Maoists are incapable of 
managing themselves, but they also disburse large cash 
budgets that the Maoists are adept at tapping into. Funding 
a movement of the size and geographical extent that the 
Maoists have created is not easy but there is no sign that a 
lack of income alone will prove a decisive factor in 
weakening the insurgency. 
2. Weaponry 
When the Maoists started their armed struggle, they had 
no organised military force to speak of and no real 
weaponry. According to Maoist leader Rabindra Shrestha, 
at the outset they had only two rifles, one of which was 
broken.123 But as the Maoists stepped up their campaign, 
they started making their own muskets, taking licensed 
shotguns and other weapons from local residents and 
capturing the .303 rifles of the police. More recently they 
have enhanced their arsenal, primarily by capturing 
weapons from the security forces, to include sophisticated 
automatic weapons, explosives and mortars. Prachanda 
states that, "in the process of waging war we managed to 
snatch [a] few rifles from the armed police. It is these rifles 
that are now capturing automatic weapons from the royal 
army. Thus weapons sent by George Bush to suppress 
Nepalese people will soon be reaching the hands of 
Nepalese people, which will be directed against 
imperialism".124 Estimates of the exact number of weapons 
they hold vary significantly.125 
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The Maoists have also purchased arms, in particular from 
the black market in the neighbouring Indian states of Bihar 
and Uttar Pradesh, where there is a flourishing trade in 
illegal weapons. They had concentrated on buying 
detonators, explosives and bullets rather than guns but 
there is some evidence that they have also brought in AK-
47 assault rifles, which some analysts suspect are from 
north east India.126 A large arms seizure in the Bangladeshi 
port of Chittagong in April 2004 caused various observers 
to speculate that Nepal's Maoists were the intended end-
users.127 
The Maoists have skilled bomb-makers who initially 
devoted their efforts to refining various types of homemade 
explosives -- socket bombs, pipe bombs, pressure cooker 
bombs -- and gradually became more skilled in 
electronically detonated landmines. They have also used 
Indian army grenades, which may have been obtained on 
the black market. While their main source of weapons has 
tended to be the state security forces themselves, there are 
indications that their needs for fresh ammunition and 
explosives are met primarily from smuggling across the 
border with India. According to the Maoists, they have 
brought equipment from abroad in order to set up factories 
to produce high quality weaponry inside Nepal.128 
Their general approach, however, has been to avoid 
unnecessary escalation in armaments.129 While they were 
only fighting with the police, they were happy to rely 
primarily on weapons looted from police posts. It is since 
engaging with the RNA that they have sought to increase 
their stock of semi-automatic and automatic weapons and 
resorted to foreign purchases. The basic personal weapons 
of most guerrillas are SLRs, .303 rifles and muskets, 
while political commissars, senior officers and leaders opt 
for Chinese pistols, mostly looted from the police.130 The 
 
 
two Galil rifles; 25 AK-47s; five rocket launchers; ten 2-inch 
mortars; three 81mm mortars; 215 pistols and revolvers; 331 
shotguns; 22 rifles; and 369 homemade guns. These figures 
are not independently verified and seem low given the widely 
accepted estimates for the number of Maoist guerrillas and 
militia members. 
126 Crisis Group interview with an intelligence official, 
Kathmandu, December 2004. Also see Sitaram Baral, "San 
AK-47ko", Samay, 13 May 2004, which states that the Maoists 
imported AK-47 rifles bought on the Indian black market and 
distributed them in limited numbers to battalions. 
127 "Arms Cache Was on Way to Third Country", The Daily 
Star, Bangladesh, 4 April 2004. 
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seized by the security forces in 2004. 
129 Interview with Prachanda, Maoist Information Bulletin-4, 
Occasional Bulletin of CPN(M), 15 September 2003. 
130 "Small Arms in Nepal: an Overview", Deepak Thapa and 
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government's published policy on Maoist surrender from 
2003, which offers rewards for handing over weapons, 
indicates the range of armaments it believes the Maoists 
possess.131 One crucial difference that gives the Maoists 
an edge over the RNA in certain situations is that their 
weapons come from a variety of flexible sources. The 
RNA's highly specialised hardware requirements make it 
dependent on a few official sources and so vulnerable to 
supply constraints. 
While the Maoists have developed their own training 
methods they were initially reliant on guidance from Indian 
insurgent groups.132 They are still far from reaching the 
standards of professionalism that a regular army would 
expect. "They seem to know what they're doing with their 
basic tactics when it comes to ambushes", observed a 
British military expert, "but they're still a rag-tag bunch 
that should be no match for a decent army".133  
The Maoists have benefited from increasingly 
sophisticated communications technology, from radios 
and satellite phones to email and internet. It is estimated 
that they are the largest users of satellite phones in the 
country.134 They have also exploited the growth in mobile 
phone connectivity: suspicions that they had purchased 
many pre-paid mobile SIM cards was the main justification 
cited for the continued suspension of this service following 
the royal coup of February 2005. However, in the 
period immediately following the coup the Maoist 
communications network appeared to be functioning 
better than that of the government. While some Nepali 
diplomatic missions were cut off from all home news,135 
Maoists in Europe were receiving regular updates by 
satellite phone.136 They also use radio sets and cordless 
telephones adapted to function as walkie-talkies. 
The turn to e-mail and internet started in November 2001. 
Following the breakdown of the ceasefire, the Maoists' 
unofficial mouthpiece, the weekly newspaper Janadesh, 
was shut down and its journalists went underground. 
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132 Sudheer Sharma, "Purvi himalayama ashantiko ago", Himal, 
14-28 May 2001. 
133 Crisis Group interview with retired senior British army 
officer, December 2004. 
134 Crisis Group interviews with security officials, Kathmandu, 
March 2005. 
135 Crisis Group interviews with diplomats, London, Brussels 
and Geneva, February 2005. 
136 Crisis Group interviews, Western Europe, February 2005. 
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While print publications were maintained clandestinely, 
the growing use of the internet in Nepal led to the Maoists 
adopting it as a primary means of communication.137 The 
faxing of press statements to selected journalists was 
gradually overtaken by e-mail distribution within the 
country and far beyond. Maoist political and news websites 
collect press releases and offer access to online versions 
of Maoist publications in Nepali and English. According 
to one researcher, "Nepal's Maoists are the first among all 
of the world's communist movements to make good use 
of communications technology".138 
 
 
137 Maoist relations with the media will be the subject of 
future Crisis Group reporting. 
138 Bertil Lintner, "Natra yuddha lambinchha", Nepal, 17 
September-1 October 2002. 
V. MILITARY STRATEGY 
The Maoists have laid to rest the myth that Nepal is a 
peaceful country whose citizens are naturally averse to 
violence. They have forcefully maintained that violence has 
been at the heart of the capture and exercise of state power 
throughout Nepal's history.139 Their own armed struggle 
has dramatically demonstrated its viability in the face of 
initial expert indifference and scepticism, although the 
question of whether it can ever attain success is still open. 
For the Maoists, the justification of violence is not difficult. 
Mao's most influential early work, on the peasant uprising 
in his home province of Hunan, led him to a lengthy 
explanation of the rationale for bloodshed: 
…a revolution is not the same as inviting people to 
dinner or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or 
doing fancy needlework; it cannot be anything 
so refined, so calm and gentle, or so mild, kind, 
courteous, restrained, and magnanimous. A 
revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby 
one class overthrows another. A rural revolution is 
a revolution by which the peasantry overthrows the 
authority of the feudal landlord class. If the peasants 
do not use the maximum of their strength, they can 
never overthrow the authority of the landlords, 
which has been deeply rooted for thousands of 
years.140 
He further asserted that in Hunan, "it was necessary to 
bring about a brief reign of terror in every rural area.…To 
right a wrong it is necessary to exceed the proper limit, 
and the wrong cannot be righted without the proper limit 
being exceeded".141 Nepal's Maoists subscribe to this 
basic outlook and argue that Nepali history supports their 
interpretation. 
The policy on armed struggle adopted by the CPN(M)'s 
third plenum in March 1995 asserted that: 
The reactionary propaganda that the Nepalese 
people are peace-loving and that they don't like 
violence is absolutely false. It is an incontrovertible 
fact that the Nepalese people have been waging 
violent struggle for their rights since…historical 
times. Till today whatever general reforms have 
been achieved by the Nepalese people, behind them 
there was the force of violent and illegal struggle 
of the people.142  
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This point was reinforced by Prachanda in a separate 
essay: "People have not obtained even the least of gains 
without waging violent struggles. Today, the Nepalese 
society has arrived at such a point of crisis under the 
existing political system that there is no alternative on the 
part of the people other than to smash it".143 
The Maoists judged that the grounds for mobilisation were 
strong: "From the year 1951 onwards till today, mainly 
the Nepalese peasants and other sections of the people 
have been joining in [a] countless number of violent and 
armed conflicts against the reactionary state, and the anti-
establishment feeling among Nepalese people has been 
very strong". The CPN(M) presented the new armed 
struggle as the chance to complete a long-running 
struggle and to represent a "great historical legacy".144 
The Maoist strategy, therefore, is based on armed struggle, 
and the growth of their political influence can largely be 
attributed to their military strength. The targets of their 
violence have been determined by the progressive stages 
of the conflict. The first aim was to eliminate obstacles to 
their political hegemony in rural areas, which led them to 
attack the state, primarily police posts, and rival political 
workers. The latter were far harder hit in the initial stages: 
in the first year of the war only six police were killed 
while some three dozen civilian "enemies of the people" 
were murdered.145 
The Maoists' political victims have been carefully selected. 
Up to July 2000 the vast majority (136) were Congress 
workers; the UML (22), RPP (19) and Masal (1) were 
secondary targets.146 Once the RNA was deployed and 
the war assumed a more conventional military aspect, 
the Maoists concentrated their attacks on military targets 
and the proportion of civilian killings fell.147 In contrast, 
state attacks on civilians increased,148 to the extent that 
mounting domestic and international pressure forced the 
RNA to discipline 44 soldiers for rights violations.149 
Both sides, in short, have been fighting a dirty war.150  
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A. "PROTRACTED PEOPLE'S WAR" 
The CPN(M) adopted at its unification convention in 
1991 the strategy of protracted war based on encircling 
the towns from the countryside. This concept was proposed 
by Prachanda and endorsed by the convention but it only 
took concrete form three years later. The third extended 
meeting of the party, in March 1995, adopted the following 
plans for putting the theory of people's war into practice: 
…give priority to the rural work, but do not leave 
urban work; give priority to illegal struggle, but do 
not leave legal struggle too; give priority to specific 
strategic areas, but do not leave work related to 
mass movement too; give priority to class struggle 
in villages, but do not leave countrywide struggle 
too; give priority to guerrilla actions, but do not 
leave political exposure and propaganda too; give 
priority to propaganda work within the country but 
do not leave worldwide propaganda too; give 
priority to build army organisation, but do not leave 
to build front organisations too; give priority to rely 
on one's own organisation and force, but do not 
miss to forge unity in action, to take support and 
help from international arena…151 
People's war was the essence of the Chinese communists' 
military doctrine, advocated mainly by Mao Zedong and 
codified by him in numerous writings.152 The basic 
elements of the original Chinese version of "people's war" 
are : (1) the key objective and the highest form of revolution 
is to mobilise and arm the people to seize political power; 
(2) the key factor in winning a battle is to rely totally on 
the people, for they are the solid foundation for launching 
 
 
of the nature and definition of military targets. The Maoists until 
recently enjoyed greater clarity of definition of their targets. The 
insurgency by definition reduces the distance between its militants 
and its civilian "host" population. In such a situation the counter-
insurgency is at a disadvantage. Lately the RNA has started 
emulating the Maoists by moving about in civilian clothes and 
civilian transport. Its troops have also reportedly been dressing 
up in Maoist combat gear in an effort to fool local people, but 
the fact that they have frequently been exposed by victims of 
RNA excesses suggests this ploy has not been very successful. 
The theatre of war has been transformed to some extent but 
the RNA as outsiders cannot match the Maoists on this terrain. 
151 Nekapa maobadika aitihasik dastavejharu vol. 1, Central 
Publications Department, CPN (Maoist), pp. 84-85. 
152 Mao's most influential military writings include "Problems 
of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", December 1936, 
Selected Works I (Beijing, 1967), pp. 154-225; "Problems of 
Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan", May 1938, Selected 
Works II (Beijing, 1967), pp. 373-406; "On Protracted War", 
May 1938, Selected Works II, pp. 407-84; and "Problems of 
War and Strategy", 11 November 1938, Selected Works II, pp. 
506-21.  
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war; (3) establish the people's army mainly with peasants; 
(4) unite the major and local forces with the guerrilla 
forces and militia; (5) establish solid revolutionary bases 
at places where the enemy is weak and where there are 
geographic advantages; and (6) utilise the strategies of 
people's war because they are suitable to revolutionary 
war and provide accurate guidance for fighting a war.153  
Mao's core concept of the protracted war is that it is: 
a war fought without hope of victory within 
measurable time but based on maintaining at all 
times the unity of army and people. It is the duty 
of the army, in Mao's view, so to politicise the 
population among which it fights that it not only 
draws from it men, supplies and information that it 
needs for combat, but also transforms the cultural 
and political structure of society step by step with 
the military success it wins. Revolution, thus, comes 
about not after, and as a result of victory, but through 
the process of war itself. Hence his best known 
slogan, with its very distinct meaning, "power flows 
out of the barrel of a gun".154  
The two sides are, therefore, fighting two different types 
of war in which the very concepts of victory and defeat, 
success and failure are reversed. The RNA is fighting a 
war of territory but the Maoists are fighting for something 
very different.  
In China Mao divided the process of people's revolution 
into three stages -- strategic defence, strategic balance and 
strategic offence -- a structure followed by the Nepali 
Maoists, at least in theory, throughout their armed 
campaign. Following the August 2004 CPN(M) central 
committee plenary, it was announced that the Maoists had 
entered the final of the three stages, adopting the slogan 
"let us raise the process of revolutionary transformation to 
new heights and enter into the stage of strategic offence".155 
Whether this declaration reflects reality is discussed below. 
In any case, the Maoists have always emphasised that the 
course of their struggle will neither be straightforward nor 
simply replicate existing models: 
The war will develop according to its own laws, 
not in a straight line but in a complex zigzag path. 
It is necessary to acknowledge the importance of 
Lenin's saying that the revolution always creates in 
its course of development an unusual and complex 
situation. The People's War will triumph after going 
through cycles of victory and defeat and gain and 
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155 Prachanda, press statement about the plenum, 1 September 
2004. 
loss. We shall be able to lead the People's War only 
by correctly grasping the law of contradiction, of 
transformation of wrong into right.156 
At the start of their campaign, they warned that the war 
would be "quite uphill, full of twists and turns and of a 
protracted nature".157 But while "making use of all forms 
of struggle", they would stick principally to "the strategy 
of encircling the city from the countryside, with agrarian 
revolution as the axis and from the midst of and in 
conjunction with the rural class struggle".158 
In fact, much Maoist strategy is simply military 
commonsense, albeit codified by Mao on the basis of 
particular experience. Most insurgencies, whether 
consciously or not, adopt Maoist-style tactics of guerrilla 
warfare. Prachanda has argued that Prithvinarayan Shah's 
campaign to unite Nepal in the mid-eighteenth century 
illustrates the central features of Maoist protracted war 
doctrine.159 
1. Strategic defence 
The attacks carried out by the Maoists to launch the 
"people's war" clearly indicated their political and 
revolutionary priorities. The armed struggle was launched 
on 13 February 1996 with surprise attacks on police posts 
in the western districts of Rolpa and Rukum and the eastern 
district of Sindhuli. In Rolpa the fighting lasted for a few 
hours, while in Rukum and Sindhuli the police handed 
over their weapons without a struggle. In Gorkha district 
the Maoists underlined their political intent by attacking 
Chyangling village's Agricultural Development Bank and 
Small Farmer's Development Project and burning papers 
relating to loans. 
They also signalled their moralistic agenda with an attack 
on Gorkha's Manakamana Distillery. On the same night 
their petrol bomb attack on the Pepsi Cola factory on the 
outskirts of Kathmandu showed that they had multinational 
corporations in their sights and were willing to strike in 
the capital as well as the more remote rural areas. It was 
only after five days that the Maoists formally claimed 
responsibility for these attacks in a statement from 
Prachanda.160 
At first glance these attacks were not terribly violent -- no 
lives were lost -- but they were intended as a sign of the 
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determination of the Maoists to pursue a sustained armed 
uprising. In the words of one leftist analyst, "those events 
gave birth to a completely new possibility in terms of the 
construction of military force. In fact this was a new 
undertaking in the Nepali class war that had never before 
occurred in the country's history".161 However, these 
apparently minor and scattered events in a handful of 
districts did little to shake the political establishment 
in Kathmandu. 
The first, defensive stage took some five years and 
involved a progression through six distinct working plans 
which were adapted to developing circumstances.162 
2. The New Line: Prachandapath 
After five years of armed struggle, the Maoists carried out 
a full assessment of their progress. They had established 
at least temporary base areas in a number of districts,163 
and the party's influence had grown at an unprecedented 
rate. But these successes brought their own problems. 
The base area policy was clearly not emulating the 
revolutionary Chinese model, and the rapid expansion 
of cadres and activities led to organisational challenges. It 
was time to re-examine strategy. 
The Maoists' second national convention, held at a secret 
location in February 2001, was the first mass meeting of 
the party since the start of the armed insurgency. The 
outcome was adoption of a new line that was given the 
name "Prachandapath". Proposed by Prachanda himself 
in his political report, it was ratified along with a change 
to the party constitution which resulted in his appointment 
as chairman.164 The new strategy basically called for more 
focus on urban insurrection while continuing the build-up 
in rural areas and working to surround the towns. 
The need for a change was justified by the argument that 
no single established model of proletarian revolution could 
still be appropriate given changing global conditions.165 
The initial faith that "protracted people's war" was suited 
to Nepal's situation was undermined by a growing 
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165 CPN(M) press statement, 25 February 2001. 
realisation that a decades-long struggle along Chinese 
lines was unlikely to be successful. Doubts that a slow 
build-up in rural areas would lead in itself to a decisive 
revolution led to a marrying of Maoist and Leninist tactics: 
the "people's war" in the villages would be complemented 
by a push for "people's rebellion" in towns and cities. 
In some respects this was not so new. The policy of the 
CPN (Unity Centre) in 1991 had acknowledged that, "in 
the specificities of our country and the current world 
situation, the significance of urban mass movements has 
definitely increased".166 Given the experience of the 1990 
people's movement, whose success had hinged on the 
final mobilisation in the capital itself, it is not surprising 
that the Maoists also acknowledged the value of targeting 
the centre of power more directly. 
Baburam Bhattarai described Prachandapath as a school 
of thought that was more than a set of tactics but less than 
an ideology.167 But the personalisation of the new strategy 
by its direct linkage to Prachanda himself raised hackles 
within the party and among other communists.168 Mohan 
Vaidya (Kiran) has made grand claims for the new line: 
"Prachandapath is now standing in a new turning point 
of history to make a qualitative leap in the process of 
becoming universal, not particular".169 But Krishna Bahadur 
Mahara has said: "It is learned from the experience of 
Russia, China and others...We haven't given up Marx, 
Lenin and Mao but we don't want to take it as dogma. We 
want a 21st-century democracy in which the people 
supervise the state so that people with money cannot 
control the elections. We want transparency and equal 
opportunities for all parties".170 
The new policy incorporating urban insurrection 
recognised that in a highly centralised country such as 
Nepal it would be hard for rural actions alone to put serious 
pressure on the state. If the Maoist revolution were to 
progress, there would have to be new ways of bringing the 
struggle directly to Kathmandu, where state power was 
concentrated. A range of tactics for urban insurrection was 
proposed: to make continuous interventions in national 
politics, to use fraternal organisations to carry out strikes 
and street demonstrations, to foment revolt within the RNA 
and to seek to polarise sympathetic and opposed political 
forces. As these tactics were primarily non-violent, they 
were used during the first ceasefire of 2001. On 21 
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September 2001 the Maoists had planned to organise a 
large anti-monarchist demonstration in Kathmandu but 
this was blocked by the government. 
Much of the Maoists' effort went into developing their 
student front, which carefully targeted the inefficiencies 
and inequities of the education system, in particular the 
fee-paying private schools. The Maoists also used non-
political riots in the Tarai towns of Butwal and Biratnagar, 
major industrial and trade centres, to further their political 
penetration. Immediately afterwards the Kathmandu valley 
erupted in riots following allegations that Indian film star 
Hrithik Roshan had made derogatory comments about 
Nepal. The Maoists were active in fomenting the unrest 
and in enforcing a two-day nationwide general strike. 
But despite these efforts to create urban instability and 
political division, the Maoist strategy of urban insurrection 
has not demonstrated the ability to mobilise enough support 
to make its threat of revolution in the cities appear realistic. 
It has employed sometimes conflicting tactics -- trying to 
show a presence in the capital through bomb explosions 
and killings while at the same time holding out the 
possibility of collaboration with mainstream parties. 
The political balance required to make Prachandapath 
successful is difficult and depends upon driving a wedge 
between the "constitutional forces" of the mainstream 
political parties and the monarchy. The Maoists know that 
to launch a successful mass movement against the 
monarchy they will have to cultivate links with sympathetic 
elements within the political mainstream. At the same time 
they will have to weaken the monarchy's grip on power, 
primarily through encouraging rebellion within the RNA, 
which remains loyal to the king. This is not an easy 
proposition. "If we can encourage the fracturing of the 
royal army, then the strategy of popular uprising will be 
successful", says a central Maoist leader, "but this will 
take some time".171 The combination of "people's war" 
and urban uprising strategies for revolution has not been 
tested elsewhere and offers no guarantee of success. Maoist 
leaders and workers acknowledge that Prachandapath will 
prove its validity only by success.172 
3. Strategic balance 
The central goal in achieving strategic balance is to reduce 
the capacity and influence of the state while building up 
an alternative government-in-waiting. It requires the 
development of military capacity sufficient to hold one's 
own against opposing forces, though not necessarily 
equality. As always in Maoist doctrine, it is not the number 
of troops or range of their equipment that counts but the 
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172 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, January 2005. 
ways in which tactics can be employed to make the most 
of existing capabilities and put the enemy on the wrong 
foot. The Maoists claim they reached the stage of strategic 
balance from the start of their direct confrontation with the 
RNA in November 2001,173 following the breakdown of 
the first ceasefire and the abandonment of abortive talks. 
By then the Maoists felt that they had weakened the "old 
regime" to the extent that their "new regime" would start 
to be seen as an equivalent force. They marked entry to 
this stage with a "general offensive" involving audacious 
simultaneous attacks on multiple targets, including army 
bases. 
At that point, the RNA's assessment of Maoist strategy was: 
"Establishment of bases in rural areas in order to encircle 
the towns and cities and finally encircle Kathmandu valley. 
For this they are carrying out ambushes and other terrorist 
activities…and strengthening their organisation".174 The 
Maoists attempted to reduce the state's reach through attacks 
on police posts to force withdrawal; attacks on mainstream 
party activists to eliminate political competition; attacks 
on local government bodies and forced resignations of 
officers; attacks on infrastructure to reduce the state's 
delivery capacity; and the intimidation and cooption of 
remaining institutions and civil servants, such as teachers. 
These tactics, helped by the state's ineffective response, 
were first notably successful earlier in the mid-western 
Maoist "heartland" districts of Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, 
Jajarkot, Kalikot and Pyuthan. As state presence was 
reduced there -- a clearly visible trend by 1999 -- the 
abandoned countryside fell largely under Maoist sway. 
The escalation of the military conflict following the 
mobilisation of the RNA during the state of emergency 
declared in November 2001 only hastened this process. 
By early 2004 the Maoists asserted that the formation of 
the URPC and the declaration of regional autonomous 
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people's governments had "immensely contributed to 
consolidate the Base Areas and to prepare for impending 
strategic offensive through the country".175 However, 
whether the Maoists have ever been successful in creating 
base areas is open to differing interpretations. The classical 
Maoist definition of a base area is a region where the 
presence of the "reactionary state" is entirely eliminated, 
and there is a genuine attempt to exercise "new people's 
power".176 
According to the principles developed by Mao and the 
Chinese Communist Party during their struggle for power, 
five conditions are essential to the creation of functional 
base areas: an extensive and reliable popular support base, 
a communist party guided by correct principles and solid 
organisation, a powerful people's army, suitable terrain 
for military action and sufficient economic resources to 
support the population.177 
According to Baburam Bhattarai, base areas are bordered 
by "guerrilla areas" where Maoist and state military control 
are in flux. Base areas are a more stable and developed 
form of such guerrilla areas. Beyond both of these is the 
area of state control, which should be subjected to repeated 
guerrilla incursions and attacks; this he defines as the 
"guerrilla action region".178 When asked in an interview, 
"where is your Yenan?",179 Prachanda replied: "All of the 
country's rural areas have become Nepal's Yenan".180 
In fact the Maoists had acknowledged even before the 
launch of the people's war that because of the prevailing 
conditions, "it is not found possible for the armed struggle 
in Nepal to survive independently in certain specific 
areas, to expand from there just as in China's Ching-Kang 
Shan".181 According to a leftist analyst who was once a 
colleague of the Maoists, the CPN(M) has realised that 
the process of rural advance towards building "liberated 
areas" will never create decisive military momentum, and 
the base area concept has, therefore, had to assume a 
lesser role.182 
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4. From the 2003 Ceasefire to the Next Offensive 
All these were factors in the decision to call a ceasefire 
and talk to the government of Lokendra Bahadur Chand, 
appointed by the king following his dismissal of Sher 
Bahadur Deuba's elected government in October 2002. 
The ceasefire was announced on 29 January 2003 and 
stabilised when both sides signed a 22-point code of 
conduct on 13 March.183 However, talks never reached 
substantive issues, and both sides accused the other of 
violating the ceasefire conditions. There are many reasons 
why the negotiations failed, including a lack of technical 
skills that was exacerbated by unprofessional facilitation. 
Neither side was well prepared for serious discussions. 
But the big political questions were the main obstacles. 
The Maoists were certainly prepared for failure of the 
talks, and they used the ceasefire for intensive political 
and military development. In Kathmandu they milked the 
publicity value of their high-ranking negotiators. Despite 
public disgust at Maoist brutality, their press conferences 
were well attended by journalists and onlookers straining 
to get a view of the underground leaders, whose notoriety 
had been transformed by an aura of glamour. 
Their negotiating position was designed to appeal to a 
mainstream audience: the proposed model of a roundtable 
conference, interim government and constituent assembly 
carefully avoided any reference to dictatorship of the 
proletariat or rolling cultural revolutions.184 Meanwhile, 
the declaration of successive new regional autonomous 
people's governments underlined their longer term plans, 
while military recruitment and training quietly continued 
on a large scale. 
The period following the breakdown of the talks and 
ceasefire saw the most intense escalation of the conflict. 
The international flow of military aid to the RNA, designed 
to give the Maoists "a bloody nose" and force them back 
to the negotiating table in a weakened position, was viewed 
positively by the Maoists. They concluded that in particular 
the heightened involvement of India and the U.S., but also 
the supply of weaponry from Belgium and advice from 
the UK, were not setbacks but had in fact "prepared a 
favourable ground to raise the P[eople's] W[ar] to the third 
and higher stage of strategic offensive".185 Already in early 
2004 the party leadership was preparing for that transition 
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and claiming that military and political progress had laid 
the foundations for the next stage: 
Another specificity has been the highly successful 
political offensive carried out during [the] ceasefire 
and negotiations by boldly presenting [a] minimum 
program to bring about a progressive democratic 
change in the country. This prepared [the] ground 
for moving ahead towards strategic offensive and 
general insurrection when the old state rejected the 
political agenda put forward by the Party. In the 
immediate military plan three stages were chalked 
out…a plan of carrying out decentralised actions in 
the first phase, relative[ly] centralised ones in the 
second and big centralised ones in the third.186 
While the number of Maoists the RNA claimed to have 
killed since August 2003 seemed to suggest that the 
guerrilla forces must be on their last legs, a proposition 
widely accepted in Kathmandu diplomatic and government 
circles, the Maoists struck back in March and April 2004 
with devastating attacks on the district headquarters of 
Bhojpur, in the eastern hills, and Beni in the west. As 
always, the RNA could truthfully claim that the Maoists 
did not completely overrun these towns and certainly could 
not hold them, but the psychological blow was grave. The 
attack on Beni demonstrated not only that the Maoists 
retained the logistical and political capacity to mobilise 
thousands but that their military capacity had definitely 
increased. 
The attack on Beni was well planned and executed on 
different fronts: for perhaps the first time the Maoists 
showed that they could use mortars effectively in a classic 
night-time assault on a fixed defensive position, while 
their detailed preparations included the commandeering 
of stretchers and medical supplies and setting up of field 
medical posts. This was an important military development 
given the garrison nature of most RNA deployments in 
rural Nepal. Very few civilians were caught in the carefully 
executed assault; most had been warned by the Maoists in 
advance that an attack was in preparation. What most 
impressed one senior Western military expert was that the 
Maoists were able at the last minute to bring forward their 
timetable by 48 hours, "a remarkable feat for any army".187 
On the evening following the Beni attack, Prachanda 
released a press statement: 
This second qualitatively successful action 
immediately after the centralised action of Bhojpur 
sometime ago has forcefully refuted false 
propaganda spread by the enemy [about the 
weakening of the Maoists' military strength] and 
forcefully proved the development and invincibility 
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of the people's war. Through decentralised actions 
throughout the country and these series of latest 
actions, the People's Liberation Army has established 
its military supremacy over the hoodlum Royal 
Army. Until the achievement of a forward-looking 
political solution along with complete changes, the 
series of military actions will continue.188 
These major military attacks were, moreover, timed to 
extract the maximum benefit from the political disarray 
in Kathmandu. The king's second directly appointed 
government, Surya Bahadur Thapa's, was under mounting 
pressure from a joint political party protest campaign. Far 
from offering a decisive strategy to take on the Maoists, 
Kathmandu was more riven than ever, and the Maoists 
had an embarrassment of choices for rifts to exploit. As 
much as their self-proclaimed military advances, it was 
the weakness and indecisiveness of the "old regime" that 
emboldened them. 
By the time they convened their August 2004 plenum in 
western Nepal, Surya Bahadur Thapa had been replaced 
as prime minister by Sher Bahadur Deuba. To Nepal's 
international backers, the four-party coalition he cobbled 
together represented the best hope for a broad-based united 
front capable of giving political shape to a concerted 
counter-insurgency effort. To the Maoists, the unstable 
mix of opportunistic parties and palace appointees was 
an invitation to move towards a decisive confrontation. 
B. ONE YEAR OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE 
The Maoists announced the launch of their strategic 
offensive on 31 August 2004.189 The first sub-stage was 
defined as a strategic counter-offensive. The Maoists used 
the claim of impending Indian military intervention to call 
for basic military training, both offensive and defensive, 
to be given to all villagers and for preparations for a 
Vietnam-style "tunnel warfare".190 
According to politburo member and western divisional 
commander Diwakar, the Maoists had moved into the 
final stage of the armed campaign to capture state power. 
"Within this a number of planned battles must be 
fought, and only at the end will we reach a [general] 
insurrection".191 For the Maoists, the critical characteristic 
of the final offensive stage is that it takes place when there 
is a final polarisation and reduction of the conflict to a 
clash between two opposed armies. As spokesperson 
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Krishna Bahadur Mahara said in an interview in early 
2005, "…now it is bi-polar, and the real war is now 
between two armed forces -- one belonging to the king 
and the other to the revolutionary struggle."192 
The Maoists have not specified any time period in which 
to complete the strategic offensive and are cautious when it 
comes to promising rapid victory. Have they overestimated 
the strength of their position? Are they overextending 
themselves? In contrast, by the time the Chinese 
communists moved onto their final offensive, they 
commanded a vast regular army and held large swathes 
of territory securely. 
Nepal's Maoists have certainly demonstrated their 
trademark lack of modesty in claiming to be on the cusp 
of a successful all-out offensive while their campaign still 
faces a range of formidable obstacles. In the words of their 
supporters, "in the Maoist conception, the revolutionaries 
launch a 'strategic offensive' when they are able to make 
their immediate aim the decisive destruction of the enemy's 
armed forces and the establishment of the rule of the people 
throughout the country".193 The weakness of the Nepali 
state's political response to the insurgency is clear but the 
Maoists hardly seem capable of the "decisive destruction" 
of the RNA. Impartial military analysts agree that the RNA 
cannot re-establish control over the entire country but are 
equally emphatic that the state can hold its minimum 
defensive positions, even if that means only district 
headquarters and the capital. 
The Maoists' determinedly upbeat pronouncements on 
their military progress are at odds with official accounts, 
which claim their fighting capacity has been decimated, 
and they have suffered a succession of serious setbacks. 
For example, the RNA claimed that it repelled 
simultaneous attacks on security force bases in the Tarai 
districts of Siraha and Dhanusha on the night of 9 May 
2005, timed to coincide with the arrival in Kathmandu of 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs 
Christina Rocca.194 In an interview a week later, however, 
Maoist eastern divisional commander Ananta claimed that 
"we were completely successful in our plan. The Mirchaiya 
Unified Command barracks were captured. Bandipur was 
hit and partly captured. The other two, Chorhawa and 
Dharapani, were hit hard".195 According to Ananta: 
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The biggest achievement of this fighting is that it 
has established the basis for positional warfare in 
the days to come. The success of the first plan of 
the strategic offensive on the eastern front has 
confirmed our party's analysis that the strategic 
offensive would focus on highways, cities and 
headquarters. We have learned not only mobile 
and positional warfare; we have also learned to 
fight stable positional warfare….After the 
accomplishments of this battle, the enemy mobilised 
thousands of Royal Army soldiers, including its 
Ranger Battalion, its best contingent, to encircle and 
destroy us. But the PLA not only fought heroically 
and foiled their attempts but also inflicted serious 
losses on the enemy and captured heavy weapons 
and ammunition from them.196 
As always, the conflicting assessments reflect the 
propaganda aims of the two sides. In the post-February 
2005 environment, the complete absence of any 
independent reporting of events makes it even more 
difficult to judge the truth. In the Siraha clashes, the RNA 
claimed that some three dozen local residents were 
"apparently used as human shields" by the Maoists.197 
Diwakar, in contrast, insists that "since they could not 
face the PLA, the Royal terrorists began to attack the local 
people with deadly weapons".198 
The assertions of both armed parties are unreliable and, in 
current circumstances, unverifiable. But in terms of 
Maoist policy, the crucial question is: what is "victory"? 
Many close observers of the CPN(M) are convinced that 
the Maoist leadership has long been aware that an all-out 
military victory is not only infeasible but also undesirable. 
As one Maoist supporter put it: 
They don't just want to seize power, they want to 
retain it and use it to transform Nepal. They know 
that smashing the state by force of arms will be 
difficult and ultimately unsustainable. They're well 
aware how the world would react to a violent 
overthrow of Kathmandu and how difficult that 
would make it for them to remain in power.199  
The Maoists have always seen political and military actions 
as two sides of the same coin: this basic assumption lies 
at the core of all their policy statements and war strategies. 
It would be strange to expect their conception of victory 
to be any different. 
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VI. WHAT MIGHT THEY SETTLE FOR? 
If the Maoists were to attain some degree of power, what 
would their objectives be? Given some of their stated 
preferences, Cultural Revolution-era China might be more 
of a guide than the pragmatic united front tactics that Mao 
earlier espoused. China before the Cultural Revolution took 
a transitional approach to the bourgeoisie but during the 
Cultural Revolution concentrated on the elimination of class 
enemies.200 However, the political system implemented by 
the Chinese communists when they came to power still 
reads as a basic template for the CPN(M)'s stated 
policies.201 
The model adopted by China for putting "new democracy" 
into practice was a "people's democratic dictatorship", a 
concept formalised by Mao as the communists entered 
Beijing.202 He later clarified its essence as "democracy for 
the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries".203 The 
Nepali Maoists have indicated that they would follow the 
Chinese precedent and deny political rights to those they 
deemed opposed to socialist transformation.204 The 1954 
Chinese constitution did not give special status to the 
Communist Party nor did it mention specifically what type 
of other parties would be permitted but the reality was a 
 
 
200 "The political policy of the communist party was to continue 
with the coalition with this class, and the economic policy was 
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one-party state.205 Basic political rights -- freedom of 
speech, press, assembly, association and demonstration -- 
were all in theory constitutionally guaranteed206 but proved 
meaningless. The program of the United People's 
Revolutionary Council is strikingly similar: 
In the New Democratic/People's Democratic system‚ 
the fundamental and political rights of all people 
including the rights to speak, write, publish, hold 
meetings and demonstrations and form organisations 
and political parties, elect and get elected, profess 
or not profess religions, settle in the place desired‚ 
etc. shall be guaranteed. Employment, education 
and health shall be considered as the fundamental 
rights of the people. Contrary to the propaganda of 
the reactionaries that there is one-party dictatorship 
of the communist party in New Democracy/People's 
Democracy‚ full freedom will be guaranteed for 
various patriotic, democratic and leftist parties on 
the basis of mutual co-operation and supervision 
with the communist party for a long time.207 
If the warnings about "co-operation and supervision" were 
not sufficient to sound alarms, the program further clarifies 
that "the people of reactionary classes who would play [a] 
reactionary role during the people's revolution and act 
against the cause of the country and the people shall be 
deprived of all political rights for a definite period".208 The 
Maoists promise an elected National House of People's 
Representatives, which would "function according to the 
principles of democratic centralism".209 In their terms, 
democratic centralism means "maintaining a proper balance 
between democracy and centralism", with "proletarian 
leadership in every sector…and a method of high 
application of the mass-line".210 Moreover, the Maoists' 
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time they have to keep within the bounds of socialist discipline". 
Mao Zedong, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among 
the People", 27 February 1957, in Selected Works, op. cit., vol. 
v, p. 389. 
210 Common Minimum Policy and Program of the URPC, 
Article 9. 
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original aim after completing the "new democratic 
revolution" is described as "immediately moving towards 
socialism, and, by way of cultural revolutions based on 
the theory of continuous revolution under the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, marching to communism -- the golden 
future of the whole [of] humanity".211 
The threat of Maoist political totalitarianism must be taken 
seriously and has been underlined by their conduct to date. 
They have often used violence to target the very classes 
for whom they claim to be fighting, thus raising questions 
about their "hearts and minds" strategy. The character 
of Maoist rule in the parts of the country they control 
has tended to be authoritarian: for example, rhetorical 
commitments to ensuring freedom of speech have not 
extended to allowing anyone to speak out against them. In 
the words of Khadga Bahadur Bishwakarma, the head of 
the Maoist Bheri-Karnali autonomous government, "there 
will be a ban for a specific period on all forces or parties 
playing a counterrevolutionary role".212 The allegation of 
"counterrevolutionary" tendencies is a broad brush that 
has in the past been used to tar a wide range of opponents, 
including workers for all the mainstream political parties. 
However, while the ultimate goal of socialism and 
communism remains official Maoist policy, since the 
2003 ceasefire talk of the "new democratic revolution" 
has been gradually displaced by a commitment to complete 
the bourgeois democratic revolution. As Prachanda himself 
put it unambiguously, "the basic political strategy of the 
Party is to free the Nepalese society from feudalism 
and imperialism through the bourgeois democratic 
revolution".213 This implies a significant shift in objectives, 
and one that would play a major role in shaping Maoist 
activities and approach to any future negotiations. At the 
same time as confirming that the Maoists' strategic 
offensive would continue, spokesman Krishna Bahadur 
Mahara also emphasised the possibility of a peaceful 
transition via a multiparty democratic stage: "If we are 
to forge an alliance with the other parties we have to 
be flexible. We envisage a two-step revolution -- first 
a multiparty democratic republic. If it was a genuine 
democracy, then we would work for the peaceful 
transformation of the state".214 
There is ample room within Maoist ideology to make this 
transition and justify it in terms of party theory. Marxists 
 
 
211 "Theoretical Premises for the Historic Initiation of the 
People's War", op. cit. 
212J. Pandey, "Maobadi yenanma bandukko shasan", Nepal, 
1-15 February 2004. 
213 Prachanda, "A Brief Introduction to the Policies of the 
C.P.N. (Maoist)", The Worker, No. 9, February 2004. 
214 Isabel Hilton, "The King and Mao", Financial Times, 14 
May 2005. 
have always been preoccupied with questions of the 
historical appropriateness of types of revolution. Lenin 
himself for many years believed that Russia would first 
have to undergo a democratic revolution before movement 
towards communism could be envisaged. He was only 
a belated convert to Trotsky's plan for "permanent 
revolution", which proposed skipping the democratic 
stage of development entirely and jumping into a 
proletarian-driven class transformation. 
In the most significant Maoist writing on the topic, 
Baburam Bhattarai cites Engels in support of his 
argument that "a proletarian party needs to uphold 
the program of a bourgeois republic in a country like 
present-day Nepal".215 Bhattarai quotes Engels' criticism 
of the Bakuninist anarchists in nineteenth century Spain, 
implying that there is a clear parallel for Nepal: "Spain 
is such a backward country industrially that there can be 
no question there of immediate complete emancipation 
of the working class. Spain will first have to pass through 
various preliminary stages of development and remove 
quite a number of obstacles from its path".216 
Ironically, Bhattarai's dismissal of "Bakuninist" approaches 
recalls nothing more than the classic critique of Naxalism 
from within the mainstream Indian communist 
movement.217 As Mohit Sen observed of Naxalite strategy, 
"the central idea was that one should not wait for the people 
to be ready for armed struggle but to prepare the people for 
armed struggle by the starting of such a struggle by 
dedicated revolutionaries.…This was, of course, nothing 
but the old anarchism of Blanqui and Bakunin dressed up 
in the new tunic of Lin Biao's army".218 The fact that 
Bhattarai, and indeed Prachanda in many similar comments 
on the need for completing the bourgeois democratic 
revolution, adopt the language of mainstream Indian 
communists rather than Naxalites is highly significant.219 
A senior Indian communist leader has pointed to these 
parallels: 
 
 
215 Baburam Bhattarai, "Royal Regression and the Question of a 
Democratic Republic in Nepal", in Monarchy vs. Democracy: 
The Epic Fight in Nepal (New Delhi, 2005), p. 11. 
216 Friedrich Engels, "The Bakuninists at Work", cited in 
Bhattarai, "Royal Regression", ibid, p. 11. 
217 The Naxalite movement, named for the village of Naxalbari 
in India's West Bengal (on the Nepal border), was a late 1960s 
Maoist uprising. It was largely defeated by a tough security 
response and by mainstream communist parties outflanking the 
Naxalites politically, carrying out land reform to build a small 
peasant support base. 
218 Mohit Sen, The Traveller and the Road (Delhi, 2003), p. 
285. 
219 A full year before the royal coup, Prachanda chose to 
emphasise that "Marxism does not oppose adult suffrage and 
the representative institution elected thereof", "On the State 
and Democracy", The Worker, No. 9, February 2004. 
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The Maoists must be tempted with a CPM-style 
model.220 We can try to persuade them with an 
amnesty and mainstream participation. If they get a 
majority, so be it. There is also fatigue, and a long 
fight can encourage people who are getting tired of 
operations to find some face-saving mechanism, 
such as if they could claim "victory" on something 
such as land reform. Some are extremists but not 
all…once [the UML] came into the mainstream, 
they became power-oriented, all parliamentary 
machinations. That disillusioned the youth and 
created a potential Maoist following. That section 
can be brought back into the mainstream.221 
The Maoists will obviously need to deliver some successes 
to their cadres, whom they have done little to prepare for 
any sense of compromise with mainstream democratic 
forces. And they do have some bottom lines. In particular, 
they would want to see major moves on land reform, 
caste and ethnic equality, regional devolution and the 
monarchy. On the last, they still claim to be flexible, 
although it is hard to believe that current circumstances 
have not emboldened them and raised hopes that they can 
"win" the end of the monarchy. As for the rest, there is 
nothing politically insurmountable. When asked what the 
Maoists would settle for, a top-level Indian bureaucrat 
was optimistic: 
They need a share in working out political 
arrangements, a level playing field to participate, 
an amnesty of some sort, to be seen by their own 
cadres to have got some elements of their program 
accepted. This is quite possible. It's not inconceivable 
to get an agenda they could sign up to.222  
Much would then depend on the Maoists' own calculations 
for entering electoral politics: if they can be persuaded -- 
and persuade themselves -- that they have a viable future 
in the political mainstream, they may well be ready to talk 
seriously. 
 
 
220 CPM is the standard abbreviation for the mainstream 
Communist Party of India (Marxist), which has led the United 
Front government in West Bengal since 1977. 
221 Crisis Group interview, New Delhi, December 2004. 
222 Crisis Group interview, New Delhi, December 2004. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Whatever the outcome of their armed insurgency, the 
Maoists have changed politics in Nepal irrevocably. They 
broke the tacit consent of the post-1990 compromise and 
turned previously marginal issues into central questions 
that the state cannot avoid. In doing this they have 
convinced many of their initial assertion that the 1990 
settlement contained inherent flaws and was not a stable 
division of political power.223 They have brought into sharp 
focus the failures of past gestures towards land reform, 
ethnic, caste and gender equality and regional issues, social 
and economic iniquities, and decades of failed development. 
They have returned the possibility of a new constitution 
drafted by an elected body to the heart of the mainstream 
agenda and, helped by the palace, they have been largely 
responsible for making the formerly taboo topic of 
republicanism a rallying call for activists within the 
established parties. They have, in short, let many genies 
out of their bottles. Regardless of the success or failure of 
their own movement, they have changed the environment 
in which future governments will have to work. 
Most visibly and painfully, however, the Maoists have 
successfully demonstrated that Nepali society does indeed 
contain a capacity for violence that can be turned to political 
ends. The Maoists argue that the trauma of insurgency is a 
necessary corrective to centuries of oppression and, in 
comparison to this history of brutal state neglect, a price 
worth paying for radical reform. But mainstream democrats 
accuse them of having foreclosed the possibilities for 
progressive reform by undermining the achievements 
of the 1990 people's movement and incapacitating 
government. The mainstream consensus is that the Maoists, 
and their deliberate militarisation of the state, are primarily 
to blame for the resurgence of an authoritarian monarchy. 
The culture of violence, intimidation and summary justice 
which they have introduced across the country may prove 
hard to dislodge. 
The Maoists also face intense critiques from fellow Nepali 
communists who view them as adventurists who have 
misread the political situation and embarked on a 
dangerously counterproductive course. While their overall 
objectives may be shared, mainstream communists reject 
the arguments for an immediate armed struggle and insist 
that a popular mass base should instead be cultivated and 
mobilised by peaceful means. Signs that Prachanda has 
been fashioning the movement around an all-powerful 
central command with personality cult trappings have 
also brought grave misgivings. The Maoists continue to 
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look politically isolated, and clashes with even the most 
ideologically similar parties, such as Janamorcha, show 
how far they still are from winning the political argument. 
Still, whether through force of arms, force of ideas or 
a combination of both, the Maoists have emerged as a 
formidable political organisation. They have been more 
successful than anyone envisaged, and their strategy of 
people's war has resulted in an armed movement that will 
not be easily displaced. "Prachanda and Baburam were no 
one -- we made them", says an experienced grass-roots 
communist activist.224 But the fact is that the Maoists have 
managed to overshadow the mainstream. There can be no 
resolution of the conflict without confronting their strengths 
and tackling their political agenda. 
There are, however, encouraging signs that serious 
negotiations will be possible. The Maoists themselves have 
made ideological moves which open up the possibility of 
a principled compromise that they could sell to their cadres. 
They are not the next Khmer Rouge, nor are they a terrorist 
organisation that refuses to talk. The mainstream parties 
are facing up to the need for structural reforms in Nepali 
society and for a more equitable distribution of power. 
The seven-party alliance's acceptance of a constitutional 
assembly as a model for reform could tempt the Maoists 
into more substantive talks.225 
International opinion towards the Maoists has not softened 
but policymakers are increasingly willing to engage them 
if they abide by certain rules. "We shouldn't have any 
trouble talking to the Maoists", observes one senior Indian 
national security expert. "But only if they observe two 
conditions: to drop links with Indian extremists and to 
accept multiparty democracy".226 
The unilateral three-month ceasefire announced by the 
Maoists in September 2005 has provoked predictable 
reactions. A population battered by years of war has largely 
welcomed the reduction in violence, however temporary 
and conditional. So, too, have state security personnel and 
their families, many of whom are constantly harassed and 
threatened by the Maoists. Mainstream parties have taken 
the truce as partial proof of good faith but the Maoists will 
have to work hard to convince them that they can abandon 
their habit of violent repression. The royal government, 
pushed by a suspicious military leadership, has refused to 
reciprocate the ceasefire and insists the Maoists cannot be 
trusted. The RNA has used the ceasefire to arrest a few 
Maoists and to kill some others, thereby creating conditions 
for renewal of the conflict. 
 
 
224 Crisis Group interview, New Delhi, May 2005. 
225 See Crisis Group Report, Towards a Lasting Peace in 
Nepal, op. cit. 
226 Crisis Group interview, New Delhi, September 2005. 
Past experience certainly suggests the Maoists will make 
the most of the ceasefire to prepare for alternative 
scenarios, including a possible escalation of the conflict. 
But their actions are more likely to be driven by their 
assessment of threats and opportunities than by the 
"sincerity" of their desire for peace. They will make a 
serious effort to rejoin mainstream politics only if they see 
sufficient advantages in it and are convinced that they will 
not make greater gains by other means. In this, as in 
their campaign to date, they will maintain a long-
term perspective and will be armed with patience and the 
ability to countenance short-term setbacks in pursuit 
of slow progress. It is pointless to imagine that the most 
committed Maoists will ever abandon their political goals 
and the desire to achieve them. But if they decide they can 
gain more by compromise than by fighting, their capacity 
for hard-headed pragmatism may prevail. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 27 October 2005 
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APPENDIX C 
 
THE MAOIST LEADERSHIP 
 
 
HEADQUARTERS 
Prachanda: Party Chairman and Supreme Commander of the People's Liberation Army 
STANDING COMMITTEE 
1. Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda, Biswas), Brahman from Chitwan, b. 1954 (Kaski): Chairman and Supreme 
Commander of the PLA. Joined communist politics as full-time underground activist with CPN (Fourth Convention) 
in 1970s; sided with Mohan Bikram Singh in 1984 split after his long-running feud with Nirmal Lama but went with 
Mohan Baidya against Singh in 1986; became general secretary of Mashal in 1990 and remained at head of party as 
it became Unity Centre then CPN(M). Holds an Intermediate science degree from Patan Campus and Bachelor of 
Science degree (in agriculture) from Rampur Campus, Chitwan and is the author of numerous articles, policy 
documents and press statements and some books, including Nepali krantika samasyaharu (The Problems of 
Revolution in Nepal). Low public profile due to long years underground but tight grip on party. 
2. Mohan Vaidya (Kiran, Agam), Brahman from Pyuthan, b. 1937: one of the founders of the CPN(M) and 
former general secretary of Mashal. Lifelong political activist seen as major Maoist ideologue and Prachanda's 
main mentor. Was arrested in Siliguri, West Bengal while in charge of Eastern Central Command March 2004 
and remains in prison. Holds a masters degree from Tribhuvan University. 
3. Dr Baburam Bhattarai (Laldhoj, Jitbir, Mukti Manav), Brahman from Gorkha, b. 1954: formerly in charge of Mid 
Central Command, coordinator of United Revolutionary People's Council, Nepal and chief of International 
Department. Disciplined in March 2005 but then reinstated. Entered student politics 1977; founder president of All 
India Nepali Student Association. Joined CPN (Fourth Convention) and remained with Mohan Bikram Singh's Masal 
after 1986 split, leaving in 1991 to form United Peoples Front, Nepal, which became the CPN(M)'s political front. 
Leader of CPN(M) 2003 negotiating team. A brilliant student: first School-Leaving Certificate topper from outside the 
Kathmandu valley; Intermediate science from Amrit Science College, Kathmandu; Bachelor of Engineering from 
Chandigarh, India; masters from the School of Planning & Architecture, New Delhi and PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru 
University with dissertation on "Natural and regional issues in Nepal's underdevelopment". Author of numerous articles 
and books including The Nature of Underdevelopment and Regional Structure of Nepal, Rajnitik arthashastrako 
ankhijhyalbata (Politico-Economic Rationale of People's War in Nepal), Marxbad ra mahila mukti (Marxism and 
Women's Emancipation), co-written with wife, Hisila Yami. The best known public face of the Maoist movement; seen 
by some as a threat to Prachanda's supremacy.  
4. Ram Bahadur Thapa (Badal, Lakhan, Prem, Bhimsen), Magar from Chitwan, b. 1954: in charge of Eastern 
Central Command and member of CPN(M) 2003 negotiating team. School and college education from Chitwan, 
then went to USSR for higher studies but returned to Nepal for student agitation in 1979 and devoted himself to full-
time underground communist politics. Played a leading role in building political base for people's war in Rapti hills. 
In 1997 removed from all party posts and sent to labour camp under disciplinary action but was gradually 
rehabilitated and promoted. Popularly labelled as military commander but prefers to describe himself as military 
strategist. Seen as a powerful pro-Prachanda member of the standing committee. 
5. Post Bahadur Bogati (Diwakar, Ranadhwaj), Chhetri from Nuwakot, b. 1942: in charge of Mid Central 
Command and formerly of Western Central Command. Played a major role in building Maoist support in Rolpa 
and Rukum and the midwest, where he was active from the start of the people's war until March 2005. Self-
taught with wide knowledge of Marxist philosophy and seen as a powerful member of the standing committee. 
6. Krishna Bahadur Mahara (Amarsingh, Chattan, Balbhadra), Chhetri from Rolpa, b. 1958: CPN(M) spokesman, in 
charge of International Department (India) and deputy coordinator of URPC. Former coordinator of CPN(M) 2001 
negotiating team and member of CPN(M) 2003 negotiating team. Promoted to standing committee early 2005 and the 
only person apart from Prachanda who can talk to the media on behalf of CPN(M) headquarters. Holds Bachelor in 
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Education degree from Tribhuvan University and worked as a schoolteacher in Rolpa for more than a decade. Elected 
United People's Front member of parliament from Rolpa in 1991. 
7. Dev Gurung (Kanchha Bahadur, Dorje), Gurung from Manang, b. 1954: former head of Ethnic Department, Gandak 
Regional Bureau, and Tamuwan Autonomous Regional People's Government. Promoted to standing committee and 
appointed to lead Western Central Command, March 2005; probably no longer holds lower positions. Secretary of 
URPC and member of CPN(M) 2003 negotiating team. Entered communist politics as a student and became 
ANNFSU(R) president. Was arrested by police in Gorkha in 1996 and released on 6 January 2000. 
POLITBURO MEMBERS 
8. Dinanath Sharma (Kishor, Ashok), Brahman from Baglung: former Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and 
Organisations of South Asia coordinator but placed under disciplinary action in March 2005, forced to resign from 
posts and current party status unclear.  
9. C.P. Gajurel (Gaurav, Bijaya, Prabesh Kumar), Brahman from Sindhuli, b. 1948: former chief of International 
Department and responsible for relations with the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) and World 
People's Resistance Movement (WPRM); also former chairman of the All India Nepali Ekta Samaj. Arrested at 
Chennai Airport in August 2003 when trying to fly to Europe on fake British passport; currently in prison in 
Chennai, India. Holds a Masters of Science degree from Tribhuvan University. 
10. Agni Prasad Sapkota (Kanchan, Sushil, Parbat), Brahman from Sindhupalchowk, b. 1958: in charge of Narayani-
Bagmati Regional Bureau and member of URPC. Member of the 2001 CPN(M) negotiating team. Entered politics 
while a schoolteacher in Sindhupalchowk. 
11. Mani Thapa (Anukul, Anup), Magar from Pyuthan: in charge of Sagarmatha-Janakpur Regional Bureau. 
12. Matrika Yadav (Ram Singh, Pradeep, Pratik), Tarai occupational caste Hindu from Dhanusha, b. 1947: chairman of 
Madhes Autonomous Regional People's Government and chief of the Madhesi Rastriya Mukti Morcha. Member of 
2003 CPN(M) negotiating team. Arrested near Delhi in 2004 and currently in Nepal government custody. 
13. Pampha Bhusal (Shrishti, Himali, Sarita, Puja, Smriti), Brahman from Arghakhanchi, b. 1961: head of Women's 
Department; member of URPC and most senior woman in the CPN(M). 
14. Netra Vikram Chand (Viplab, Ratna Bahadur Shahi, Iman Singh), Chhetri from Rolpa: in charge of Special Regional 
Bureau under the Mid Central Command and former vice chairman of ANNFSU(R)  
15. Ishwar Man Pradhananga (a.k.a. Rabindra Shrestha, Shashi Shrestha), Newar from Bhaktapur: head of Industry 
Department. Arrested in Kathmandu in 2001 and released in 2003.  
16. Janardan Sharma (Prabhakar), Brahman from Rukum: Western Division commander. 
17. Varshaman Pun (Ananta), Magar from Rolpa: Eastern Division commander. 
18. Hitraj Pandey (Uttam), b. 1959: Basu Memorial Fourth Brigade commissar. 
19. Top Bahadur Rayamajhi (Jivan, Amar, Anil, a.k.a Kishan Pyakurel), Brahman from Arghakhanchi: member of 
URPC and in charge of NRN Command (India) since September 2004; former Lisne-Gam Brigade commissar and 
former Chairman of ANNFSU(R). Member of the 2001 CPN(M) negotiating team. Close to Baburam Bhattarai. 
20. Haribhakta Kandel (Bimal), Brahman from Gorkha: chief of the Central Finance Department. 
21. Haribol Gajurel (Shital Kumar, Prajwal), Brahman from Sindhuli: International Department member. 
22. Hitman Shakya (Suman; also Suresh, Tutu, Sagar), Newar from Baglung, b. 1960: in charge of Special Regional 
Bureau under the Eastern Central Command and chief of the Central Education Department. 
23. Nanda Kishor Pun (Pasang), Magar from Rolpa: Western Division commander. 
24. Hisila Yami (Parvati), Newar from Kathmandu: alternate politburo member; former deputy chief of International 
Department but placed under disciplinary action in March 2005 and current party status unclear. Trained architect and 
lecturer on Pulchowk Campus since 1996 until going underground. Author of many articles and Marxbad ra mahila 
mukti (Marxism and Women's Emancipation) co-written with husband Baburam Bhattarai. 
25. Kul Prasad K.C. (Sonam): alternate politburo member, currently in prison in Patna, India. 
26. Gopal Khambu (Sahila), Rai from Solukhumbu: alternate politburo member; in charge of Mechi-Koshi Regional 
Bureau and head of Kirat Autonomous Regional People's Government. 
27. Devendra Paudel (Sunil): alternate politburo member; former general secretary of ANNFSU(R), forced to resign, 
under disciplinary action. 
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28. Khadga Bahadur Bishwakarma (Prakanda), Dalit from Kalikot: alternate politburo member; chairman of Bheri-
Karnali Regional Autonomous People's Government, in charge of Bheri-Karnali Regional Bureau and chief of 
Central Dalit Department. 
29. Kumar Dahal (Vijay), Brahman: alternate politburo member and formerly in charge of Valley Bureau; former 
Chairman of All-Nepal Trade Union, currently in prison in Patna, India. 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
30. Ganga Bahadur Karki (Vishva): Bethan Memorial Fifth Brigade commissar. 
31. Santu Darai (Parwana): Mechi-Koshi Seventh Brigade commissar. 
32. Ganga Shrestha (Prabhat): former general secretary of ANNFSU(R). 
33. Gaurishankar Khadka (Rajendra): former UML leader. 
34. Kumar Paudel (Kamal): central committee member of then UPF. 
35. "Rajesh": Eastern Division vice-commander. 
36. Lokendra Bishta: currently in prison in Patna, India. 
37. Santosh Budha Magar (Bhrun): head of Magarat Autonomous Regional People's Government. 
38. Dharmendra Bastola 
39. Dhruva Parajuli (Santosh): Solu-Salleri Sixth Brigade commissar. 
40. Pavan Man Shrestha (Prabhakiran): in charge of Valley Bureau, former chairman of Newa Khala. 
41. Jayapuri Gharti: chair of All-Nepal Women's Association (Revolutionary). 
42. Uma Bhujel (Silu): member of Women's Department. 
43. Padam Rai (Vikas): Bhojpur district, position uncertain. 
44. Himal Rai: Bhojpur district, position uncertain. 
45. Savitri Kaphle (Samar [male]): in charge of Bhojpur district. 
46. Suresh Ale Magar (Sangram): currently in Nepal government custody. 
47. Hit Bahadur Tamang (Shamsher): head of Tamang Autonomous Regional People's Government, currently in prison in 
Patna, India. 
48. Ram Charan Chaudhari: head of Tharuwan Autonomous Regional People's Government. 
49. Narayan Sharma (Kamal Prasad): Communications and Publications Department, former Janadesh editor. 
50. Krishna Prasad Sapkota (Deshbandhu): Agni Sapkota's younger brother, in charge of Dolakha-Sindhupalchowk. 
51. Bamdev Chhetri (Vikalpa) 
52. Jhaku Prasad Subedi: former District Development Committee chairman, Rolpa. 
53. Purna Bahadur Gharti (Visham): former head of Rukum People's Government. 
54. Tilak Pariyar: chairman of Dalit Liberation Front. 
55. Amar Sharma (Pratap) 
56. Shriram Dhakal (Prashant): Thawang-Nuwagaon road construction committee coordinator. 
57. Bhakta Bahadur Shah: head of Jajarkot People's Government. 
58. Lekhraj Bhatta (Rakesh): in charge of Seti-Mahakali and head of Seti-Mahakali Autonomous Regional People's 
Government. 
59. Rekha Sharma: former chair of All-Nepal Women's Association (Revolutionary), currently under disciplinary action. 
60. Krishnadhwaj Khadka: former chairman of ANNFSU(R), currently under disciplinary action. 
61. Dinesh Sharma (Pramod) 
62. Chandra Prasad Khanal (Baldev) 
63. Sakuhang Kirati 
64. Babulal Pun 
65. Hemant Prakash Oli (H.P. Himali) 
66. Ganga Bahadur Tamang (Dorje): general secretary of the Tamang National Liberation Front. 
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67. Man Bahadur Thapa Magar: leader of the then United People's Front.  
68. "Apar": assigned to the eastern command. 
69. "Barun": vice-commander of Mid Division. 
70. "Uddhav": Ghorahi-Satbariya Second Brigade commissar. 
71. "Vividh": vice-commander of Western Division. 
72. "Saral" 
73. "Athak" 
74. Dipendra Pun (Sijal): Rolpa 
75. Khim Bahadur Thapa (Sunil): Mangalsen First Brigade commissar. 
76. Balaram Timilsina (Dinesh): Sindhuli district, position uncertain [?]. 
77. Manoj Jang Thapa 
78. Ishwari Dahal (Asare Kaka/Budha) 
79. Ganesh Man Gurung (Rashmi): deputy head of Magarat Autonomous Regional People's Government and Parivartan 
Memorial Ninth Brigade commissar. 
80. Dilip Maharjan: Newa Khala chairman, currently in prison in Patna, India. 
81. Tej Prakash Oli (Pratik): Bahubir Yoddha Eighth Brigade commissar. 
82. Tanka Prasad Angwohang (Prabhav): deputy head of Kirat Autonomous Regional People's Government. 
83. Dawa Tamang (Kshitij): alternate central committee member [?], head of Sindhupalchowk People's Government. 
84. Mahendra Paswan: alternate central committee member, former student leader, chief secretary of the Madhesh 
Autonomous People's Government. 
85. Lekhnath Neupane (Nirmal/Premsudha): alternate central committee member, ANNFSU(R) chairman. 
86. Dinanath Gautam (Puran): alternate central committee member. 
87. Anil Sharma (Virahi): alternate central committee member, former student leader, currently in prison in Patna, India. 
88. Pushpa Bikram Malla (Singh): alternate central committee member, formerly in charge of Dhading. 
89. Ram Karki (a.k.a. Partha Chhetri): alternate central committee member, International Department.  
90. Thaman Pariyar: alternate central committee member and head of Kaski People's Government. 
91. Kumari Moktan (Samjhana): alternate central committee member, acting head of Tamang Autonomous Regional 
People's Government and head of Makwanpur People's Government. 
92. Kali Bahadur Malla (Jitendra): alternate central committee member. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE MAOIST MOVEMENT 
 
 
The Party The Army The United Front 
Standing Committee Divisions (3) United People's Revolutionary 
Council, Nepal 
│ │ │ 
Central Committee Brigades (9) Ethnic and regional "autonomous 
people's governments" (8) 
│ │ │ 
Central Command (3) Battalions (29) United District People's Committees 
│ │ │ 
Politburo Companies United Area People's Committees 
│ │ │ 
Regional bureaus Platoons United Village People's Committees 
│ │ │ 
Sub-regional bureaus Squads United Ward People's Committees 
│   
District committees  
│ 
[The "people's militias" organised on 
a local basis are separate from other 
military units]  
Area committees   
│   
Cell committees   
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APPENDIX E 
 
THE UPPER STRUCTURE OF THE "PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY" 
 
 
 General Headquarters  
 Supreme Commander 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) 
 
Western Division Mid Division Eastern Division 
Commissar 
Dev Gurung (Kanchha Bahadur) 
Commander 
Janardan Sharma (Prabhakar) 
Vice Commander 
[unknown] 
Commissar 
Post Bahadur Bogati (Diwakar) 
Commander 
Nanda Kishor Pun (Pasang) 
Vice Commander 
Barun 
Commissar 
Ram Bahadur Thapa (Badal) 
Commander 
Barsha Man Pun (Ananta) 
Vice Commander 
Rajesh 
Brigades Brigades Brigades 
1. Ghorahi-Satbariya Second Brigade 
Commissar 
Uddhav 
Commander 
Jit (killed in action in Bardiya, 
March 2005) 
1. Mangalsen First Brigade 
Commissar 
Kim Bahadur Thapa (Sunil) 
Commander 
Vivek 
1. Bethan Memorial Fifth Brigade 
Commissar 
Ganga Bahadur Karki (Vishva) 
Commander 
Hari Shrestha (Pramod) 
2. Lisne-Gam Third Brigade 
Commissar 
Top Bahadur Rayamajhi (Jivan) 
Commander 
Sanjay 
2. Basu Memorial Fourth Brigade 
Commissar 
Hitraj Pandey (Uttam) 
Commander 
Yam Bahadur Adhikari (Pratiksha) 
2. Solu-Salleri Sixth Brigade 
Commissar 
Dhruva Parajuli (Santosh) 
Commander 
Pavel 
3. Bahubir-Yoddha Eighth Brigade 
Commissar 
Tej Prakash Oli (Pratik) 
Commander 
Kuber 
3. Parivartan Memorial Ninth Brigade 
Commissar 
Ganeshman Pun (Rashmi) 
Commander 
Madan 
3. Mechi-Koshi Seventh Brigade 
Commissar 
Santu Darai (Parvana) 
Commander 
Sanjiv 
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APPENDIX F 
 
THE 40-POINT DEMAND227 
 
 
DEMANDS RELATED TO NATIONALISM 
1. Regarding the 1950 Treaty between India and Nepal, all unequal stipulations and agreements should be removed.  
2. HMG [His Majesty's Government] should admit that the anti-nationalist Tanakpur agreement was wrong, 
and the Mahakali Treaty, incorporating same, should be nullified.  
3. The entire Nepal-Indian border should be controlled and systematised. Cars with Indian number plates, which 
are plying the roads of Nepal, should not be allowed.  
4. Gurkha recruiting centers should be closed and decent jobs should be arranged for the recruits.  
5. In several areas of Nepal, where foreign technicians are given precedence over Nepali technicians for certain local 
jobs, a system of work permits should be instituted for the foreigners.  
6. The monopoly of foreign capital in Nepal's industry, trade and economic sector should be stopped.  
7. Sufficient income should be generated from customs duties for the country's economic development.  
8. The cultural pollution of imperialists and expansionists should be stopped. Hindi video, cinema, and all kinds of such 
newspapers and magazines should be completely stopped. Inside Nepal, import and distribution of vulgar Hindi 
films, video cassettes and magazines should be stopped.  
9. Regarding NGOs and INGOs: Bribing by imperialists and expansionists in the name of NGOs and INGOs 
should be stopped.  
DEMANDS RELATED TO THE PUBLIC AND ITS WELL-BEING 
1. A new Constitution has to be drafted by the people's elected representatives.  
2. All the special rights and privileges of the King and his family should be ended.  
3. Army, police and administration should be under the people's control.  
4. The Security Act and all other repressive acts should be abolished.  
5. All the false charges against the people of Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Gorkha, Kavre, Sindhuphalchowk, Sindhuli, 
Dhanusha and Ramechap should be withdrawn and all the people falsely charged should be released.  
6. Armed police operations in the different districts should immediately be stopped.  
7. Regarding Dilip Chaudhary, Bhuvan Thapa Magar, Prabhakar Subedi and other people who disappeared from 
police custody at different times, the government should constitute a special investigating committee to look into 
these crimes and the culprits should be punished and appropriate compensation given to their families.  
8. People who died during the time of the movement should be declared as martyrs and their families and those who 
have been wounded and disabled should be given proper compensation. Strong action should be taken against the 
killers.  
9. Nepal should be declared a secular state.  
10. Girls should be given equal property rights to those of their brothers.  
11. All kinds of exploitation and prejudice based on caste should be ended. In areas having a majority of one ethnic 
group, that group should have autonomy over that area.  
 
 
227 Submitted to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba on 4 February 1996 by Dr Baburam Bhattarai on behalf of the United 
People's Front Nepal. Available at http://www.insof.org/politics/130299_40demands_Maoist.htm. 
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12. The status of dalits as untouchables should be ended and the system of untouchability should be ended once and for 
all.  
13. All languages should be given equal status. Up until middle-high school level (uccha-madyamic) arrangements 
should be made for education to be given in the children's mother tongue.  
14. There should be guarantee of free speech and free press. The communications media should be completely 
autonomous.  
15. Intellectuals, historians, artists and academicians engaged in other cultural activities should be guaranteed intellectual 
freedom.  
16. In both the tarai and hilly regions there is prejudice and misunderstanding in backward areas. This should be ended 
and the backward areas should be assisted. Good relations should be established between the villages and the city.  
17. Decentralisation in real terms should be applied to local areas, which should have local rights, autonomy and 
control over their own resources.  
DEMANDS RELATED TO THE PEOPLE'S LIVES 
1. Those who cultivate the land should own it. (The tiller should have right to the soil he/she tills.) The land of rich 
landlords should be confiscated and distributed to the homeless and others who have no land.  
2. Brokers and commission agents should have their property confiscated and that money should be invested in 
industry.  
3. All should be guaranteed work and should be given a stipend until jobs are found for them.  
4. HMG [His Majesty's Government] should pass strong laws ensuring that people involved in industry and 
agriculture should receive minimum wages.  
5. The homeless should be given suitable accommodation. Until HMG [His Majesty's Government] can provide 
such accommodation they should not be removed from where they are squatting.  
6. Poor farmers should be completely freed from debt. Loans from the Agricultural Development Bank by poor 
farmers should be completely written off. Small industries should be given loans.  
7. Fertiliser and seeds should be easily and cheaply available, and the farmers should be given a proper market price 
for their production.  
8. Flood and drought victims should be given all necessary help  
9. All should be given free and scientific medical service and education and education for profit should be completely 
stopped.  
10. Inflation should be controlled and labourers salaries should be raised in direct ratio with the rise in prices. Daily 
essential goods should be made cheap and easily available.  
11. Arrangements should be made for drinking water, good roads, and electricity in the villages.  
12. Cottage and other small industries should be granted special facilities and protection.  
13. Corruption, black marketing, smuggling, bribing, the taking of commissions, etc. should all be stopped.  
14. Orphans, the disabled, the elderly and children should be given help and protection.  
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APPENDIX G 
 
THE CPN(M) 2003 NEGOTIATING AGENDA228 
 
 
I. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES  
The goals and objectives of the negotiation between representatives of the old state and the new state are as follows:  
1. To end the present state of conflict through a forward-looking political solution and establish a lasting peace in the 
country.  
2. To solve the existing class, nationalities, regional, gender and other contradictions through political, economic and 
cultural changes. To solve the problems of nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood and to build a democratic 
and prosperous Nepal.  
3. To establish a new, strong and democratic national unity and to defend national independence and sovereignty by 
upholding democracy and nationalism as indivisible, interdependent and interrelated ensembles.  
4. To ensure the broad human and civic rights of all, particularly the underprivileged and oppressed groups, and to 
provide appropriate compensation and rehabilitation to the victims of the civil war.  
II. THE AGENDA OF THE NEGOTIATION 
Fundamental Political Agenda  
Since the question of state power or the political question is key to all the other problems, the main agenda of the 
negotiation must be political, and all the focus has to be placed on this. For a political solution out of the present crisis, a 
forward-looking new state system and a new constitution conforming to it is necessary, and it is so also because the 1990 
constitution remains practically dead in the present situation, and there is a constitutional vacuum in the country. Taking 
into consideration this ground reality, the procedure of new constitution formation and the minimum substance for the 
new constitution must be the main agenda of the negotiation.  
Although the 1990 constitution has some democratic positive features (e.g. multi-party competition, periodic elections, 
rule of law, freedom of speech and press, etc.), it has a number of serious faults and inadequacies (e.g. the so-called 
"unchangeable" features, the contradiction between the sovereignty and state power, dissolution of "real democracy" of 
oppressed classes, nationalities, regions, gender and others in the Anglo-Saxon "formal democracy", etc.), which have been 
proved in the last twelve years.  
Hence the process of formulation and content of the new constitution has to be definitely more progressive than this one. 
In the present context of new balance of political power created by the new consciousness of the twenty-first century and 
the seven-year-long intense civil war, the regressive idea to go back to the system of pre-1990 and the status quo idea of 
sticking to the 1990 achievements will not fulfill the new needs of the people and the country and solve the present crisis. 
Thus the process of formulation and the minimum content of the new constitution should be as follows:  
(a) The Process or Procedure for the Formulation of a New Constitution  
1. A broad round table conference should be organised with the consent of the revolutionary force and major political 
parties of the country so as to include all democratic, patriotic and leftist forces that are recognised among the masses 
through struggle.  
2. The round table conference should formulate an interim constitution, which will not curtail the democratic rights 
guaranteed in the 1990 constitution and will reflect the new balance of political forces, and an interim government 
should be formed under the leadership of the revolutionary force.  
 
 
228 Extracted from "An Executive Summary of the Proposal Put Forward by CPN (Maoist) for the Negotiations", 27 April 2003, 
Kathmandu. Available at http://www.insof.org/cpnm/id_cpnm/doc8.html. 
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3. Elections to a Constituent Assembly with proper representations for various classes, nationalities, regions, gender 
and communities should be held within six months under the leadership of the interim government and the Assembly 
should formulate and promulgate the new constitution.  
(b) The Minimum Content of the New Constitution  
1. The people should be fully sovereign, and state power must be solely in the hands of the people.  
2. There shall be an elected people's representative assembly as the highest representative institution with proper 
representation of all classes, nationalities, dalits, women, linguistic and religious groups, regions and distinguished 
personalities. All the bodies of the state will be accountable to this people's representative assembly. The government 
will be formed accordingly with proper representation of all.  
3. Any provision of the constitution may be amended with either a two-thirds majority in the people's representative 
assembly or through a referendum.  
4. A unified national army should be created with appropriate structural changes in the Royal Nepalese Army and the 
People's Liberation Army, and the army should be placed under the command of the people's elected representatives.  
5. Universal democratic and civic rights including multiparty competition, periodic elections, universal suffrage, rule of 
law, freedom of speech and press, fundamental and human rights, etc. should be guaranteed.  
6. All the oppressed nationalities, Madhesis (i.e. plains people) and oppressed regions of the country should be 
guaranteed national and regional autonomy with the right of self-determination.  
7. The country should be made fully secular.  
8. Education, health and employment should be made fundamental rights of the people, and free and universal basic 
education and health services should be ensured to all.  
9. New land relations should be created on the principle of "land to the tiller", and a judicious redistribution and 
advanced management of land should be carried out. A policy of self-reliant national industrialisation and protection 
to national capital and resources should be followed.  
10. All the unequal treaties, including the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty, should be cancelled and an independent foreign 
policy on the basis of panchsheel (i.e. five principles of peaceful co-existence) and nonalignment should be 
followed. A two-thirds majority in the house of people's representatives should endorse all the treaties and 
agreements with foreign countries.  
(c) It is our understanding that all the political forces desirous of finding a solution to the present crisis through a forward-
looking political solution can and must have an agreement and understanding on the above minimum content of a new 
constitution. However, since an unconditional constituent assembly will formulate the new constitution, it won't be 
appropriate both theoretically and practically to determine all the features and provisions of that constitution right now. It is 
obvious that in addition to the above minimum content of the new constitution different political forces can go to the people 
with their own views on monarchy and other progressive issues and the final verdict of the people would be acceptable to 
everybody concerned.  
III. NATIONAL AND ECONOMIC/SOCIAL QUESTIONS  
1. All the agreements, military assistance, presence and activities of foreign armies etc., that are initiated in the pretext 
of containing terrorism but which will vitiate the environment for negotiation and which are against the interest of 
the nation, should be stopped.  
2. Open borders between Nepal and India should be regulated and properly managed. All forms of intrusions, 
violations, etc. in the border areas should be contained. Work permit system should be introduced for foreign 
employees.  
3. The Gurkha recruitment centre, which has remained a blot on the nation, should be abolished and employment 
should be provided to all the Nepalese within the country itself.  
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4. Foreign monopoly in the field of industry, commerce and finance should to be ended. National industries and 
indigenous entrepreneurs should be protected and promoted. The country should be totally freed from the vicious 
circle of foreign debt within a stipulated time frame.  
5. Foreign infiltration and sabotage in the name of NGOs/INGOs should be stopped. Conditions imposed by the 
international financial institutions that are against the national interests should be invalidated.  
6. An integrated national water resources policy should be formulated to harness the immense water resource potential 
of the country. While according priority to small and medium hydroelectric projects, the entire country should be 
electrified within a stipulated time frame.  
7. The landless and poor peasants should be freed of all debts, and employment should be guaranteed to them.  
8. All types of bonded labour system, including kamaiya, harwa, charwa, etc., should be abolished with a guarantee 
of employment and settlement. All homeless persons should be provided with proper housing.  
9. There should be cheap and easy access to agricultural inputs like fertilizers, seeds, etc. and proper extension of 
irrigation facilities. Appropriate prices and markets should be provided for agricultural products.  
10. Price hikes on petroleum products and other daily necessities should be controlled. There should be wage hikes of 
workers and civil servants in proportion to the price rise.  
11. A proper mechanism should be built to award swift and harsh punishment to those indulging in corruption, 
smuggling, brokering and profiteering.  
12. A national and scientific education system should be introduced. Education should be employment-oriented. The 
privatisation and commercialisation in education should be stopped forthwith.  
13. Universal and free health services should be provided and extended especially in the rural areas.  
14. Rights of the visually impaired, disabled, old, destitute and children should be guaranteed and special provisions 
made for their care.  
15. All forms of exploitation of women should be ended, and women should be given equal rights in all fields including 
parental property. Trafficking of women should be strictly checked.  
16. All types of exploitation and oppression on the dalits including untouchability should be eliminated, and they 
should be fully ensured equal rights to live like others.  
17. For the workers, a working time of 40 hours a week and minimum wages should be fixed, and they should be 
strictly implemented.  
18. For an all-round development of youths, concrete policies should be formulated and implemented in a planned 
manner.  
19. Academic freedom and professional security of the writers, cultural activists, intellectuals, doctors, lawyers, media 
persons, engineers, teachers and others should be ensured in order to make them dedicated to the country and the 
people.  
20. Import and distribution of vulgar cinemas, videos and printed matter within the country as a medium of regressive 
foreign cultural pollution and invasion should be prohibited.  
21. Special plans for the development and extension of infrastructure like drinking water, bridges, electricity and 
others in the rural areas should be formulated and implemented speedily. A national plan for balanced 
development should be implemented to eliminate the existing imbalances between rural and urban areas and 
between different geographical regions.  
22. The rights of the Nepalese working abroad should be protected.  
23. Those killed in the course of the people's movement at different times and the People's War for the cause of the 
country and people's liberation, should to be declared martyrs, and the killers must be punished.  
24. The just demands put forward by different strata of the people and different class and mass organisations should 
be fulfilled forthwith.  
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IV. THE ISSUES CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS AND IMMEDIATE RELIEF AND REHABILITATION  
1. A high level and authoritative commission, with representatives from human rights organisations, should be 
constituted to investigate the violation of human rights in the course of the civil war in an impartial manner, and 
all the violators must be duly punished.  
2. The families of the martyrs should be provided with immediate relief and proper compensation.  
3. All those wounded in the course of the civil war should be provided free treatment.  
4. All the displaced families during the course of the civil war should be rehabilitated in their old place or other 
appropriate places.  
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING  
All the subject matters agreed between the two parties should be implemented within the stipulated time, and an impartial 
monitoring team should be formed to monitor the implementation of the agreements. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 
 
 
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an 
independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, 
with over 110 staff members on five continents, working 
through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy 
to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. 
Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. 
Teams of political analysts are located within or close by 
countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of 
violent conflict. Based on information and assessments 
from the field, it produces analytical reports containing 
practical recommendations targeted at key international 
decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, 
a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct 
regular update on the state of play in all the most significant 
situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. 
Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed 
widely by email and printed copy to officials in 
foreign ministries and international organisations and 
made available simultaneously on the website, 
www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with 
governments and those who influence them, including 
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate 
support for its policy prescriptions. 
The Crisis Group Board -- which includes prominent 
figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business 
and the media -- is directly involved in helping to bring 
the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior 
policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired 
by Lord Patten of Barnes, former European Commissioner 
for External Relations. President and Chief Executive 
since January 2000 is former Australian Foreign Minister 
Gareth Evans. 
Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels, 
with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is 
based as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. 
The organisation currently operates fifteen field offices 
(in Amman, Belgrade, Bishkek, Dakar, Dushanbe, 
Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, Nairobi, Pretoria, Pristina, 
Quito, Seoul, Skopje and Tbilisi), with analysts working 
in over 50 crisis-affected countries and territories across 
four continents. In Africa, this includes Angola, Burundi, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, the Sahel region, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; 
in Asia, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in 
Europe, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole 
region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, 
Colombia, the Andean region and Haiti. 
Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable 
foundations, companies and individual donors. The 
following governmental departments and agencies 
currently provide funding: Agence Intergouvernementale 
de la francophonie, Australian Agency for International 
Development, Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian 
International Development Research Centre, Czech 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Foreign Office, Irish 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency, Principality of Liechtenstein Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International 
Development, Republic of China (Taiwan) Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
United Kingdom Department for International 
Development, U.S. Agency for International Development.  
Foundation and private sector donors include Atlantic 
Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of New York, 
Compton Foundation, Ford Foundation, Fundação Oriente, 
Fundación DARA Internacional, Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Hunt 
Alternatives Fund, Korea Foundation, John D. & Catherine 
T. MacArthur Foundation, Moriah Fund, Charles Stewart 
Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Pierre and 
Pamela Omidyar Fund, David and Lucile Packard 
Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, Sigrid Rausing Trust, 
Rockefeller Foundation, Rockefeller Philanthropy 
Advisors and Sarlo Foundation of the Jewish Community 
Endowment Fund. 
October 2005 
Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org 
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CENTRAL ASIA 
The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the 
Afghanistan Campaign, Asia Briefing Nº11, 30 January 2002 
(also available in Russian) 
Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, Asia 
Report N°33, 4 April 2002 
Central Asia: Water and Conflict, Asia Report N°34, 30 May 
2002 
Kyrgyzstan’s Political Crisis: An Exit Strategy, Asia Report 
N°37, 20 August 2002 
The OSCE in Central Asia: A New Strategy, Asia Report 
N°38, 11 September 2002 
Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform, Asia Report N°42, 
10 December 2002 
Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistan’s Failing Dictatorship, 
Asia Report N°44, 17 January 2003 
Uzbekistan’s Reform Program: Illusion or Reality?, Asia 
Report N°46, 18 February 2003 (also available in Russian) 
Tajikistan: A Roadmap for Development, Asia Report N°51, 
24 April 2003 
Central Asia: Last Chance for Change, Asia Briefing Nº25, 29 
April 2003 
Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
Asia Report N°58, 30 June 2003 
Central Asia: Islam and the State, Asia Report N°59, 10 July 
2003 
Youth in Central Asia: Losing the New Generation, Asia 
Report N°66, 31 October 2003 
Is Radical Islam Inevitable in Central Asia? Priorities for 
Engagement, Asia Report N°72, 22 December 2003 
The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan: Ways Forward for the 
International Community, Asia Report N°76, 11 March 2004 
Tajikistan's Politics: Confrontation or Consolidation?, Asia 
Briefing Nº33, 19 May 2004 
Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects, 
Asia Report N°81, 11 August 2004 
Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan: A New 
International Strategy, Asia Report N°85, 4 November 2004 
(also available in Russian) 
The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia's Destructive Monoculture, 
Asia Report N°93, 28 February 2005 (also available in Russian) 
Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution, Asia Report N°97, 4 May 
2005 (also available in Russian) 
Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising, Asia Briefing N°38, 25 
May 2005 (also available in Russian) 
NORTH EAST ASIA 
Taiwan Strait I: What’s Left of “One China”?, Asia Report 
N°53, 6 June 2003 
Taiwan Strait II: The Risk of War, Asia Report N°54, 6 June 
2003 
Taiwan Strait III: The Chance of Peace, Asia Report N°55, 6 
June 2003 
North Korea: A Phased Negotiation Strategy, Asia Report N°61, 
1 August 2003 
Taiwan Strait IV: How an Ultimate Political Settlement Might 
Look, Asia Report N°75, 26 February 2004 
North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks?, Asia Report 
N°87, 15 November 2004 (also available in Korean and in 
Russian) 
Korea Backgrounder: How the South Views its Brother from 
Another Planet, Asia Report N°89, 14 December 2004 (also 
available in Korean and in Russian) 
North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand?, 
Asia Report N°96, 25 April 2005 (also available in Korean and 
in Russian) 
Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention, Asia Report 
Nº100, 27 June 2005  (also available in Korean) 
China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente, Asia Briefing N°42, 21 
September 2005 
SOUTH ASIA 
Pakistan: The Dangers of Conventional Wisdom, Pakistan 
Briefing Nº12, 12 March 2002 
Securing Afghanistan: The Need for More International 
Action, Afghanistan Briefing Nº13, 15 March 2002 
The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? Afghanistan & 
Pakistan Briefing Nº17, 16 May 2002 
Kashmir: Confrontation and Miscalculation, Asia Report 
N°35, 11 July 2002 
Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military, Asia Report 
N°36, 29 July 2002 
The Afghan Transitional Administration: Prospects and 
Perils, Afghanistan Briefing Nº19, 30 July 2002 
Pakistan: Transition to Democracy? Asia Report N°40, 3 
October 2002 
Kashmir: The View From Srinagar, Asia Report N°41, 21 
November 2002 
Afghanistan: Judicial Reform and Transitional Justice, Asia 
Report N°45, 28 January 2003 
Afghanistan: Women and Reconstruction, Asia Report N°48. 
14 March 2003 (also available in Dari) 
Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military, Asia Report N°49, 
20 March 2003 
Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire – Soft Landing or Strategic 
Pause?, Asia Report N°50, 10 April 2003 
Afghanistan’s Flawed Constitutional Process, Asia Report 
N°56, 12 June 2003 (also available in Dari) 
Nepal: Obstacles to Peace, Asia Report N°57, 17 June 2003 
Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation, Asia 
Report N°62, 5 August 2003 
Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Asia Report N°64, 29 September 
2003  
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Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan, Asia Report 
N°65, 30 September 2003 
Nepal: Back to the Gun, Asia Briefing Nº28, 22 October 2003 
Kashmir: The View from Islamabad, Asia Report N°68, 4 
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